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RACE AND MONEY IN POLITICS
TERRY SMITH
An intriguing discourse is developing around the question of
whether campaign finance reform can be inclusive of multiracial
interests, or whether it will ultimately materialize as a "white"
issue, the legislative incarnation of which will resound
overwhelmingly to the benefit of non-minorities. In this Article,
Professor Terry Smith demonstrates an interrelationship between
race and money in politics that lays bare the fallacy that
meaningful campaign finance reform can be achieved without
considering race. First, racial inequality creates a baseline
differential in the meaning of equal citizenship such that claims
regarding the equality that might be wrought by campaign finance
reform require a significant qualification. Second, race and
money enable each other in the political process, with money often
being used to purchase a powerful political message that divides
citizens along racial rather than class lines, thereby limiting the
potential of reform to effect policy changes for the greater public
good unless race is confronted head on. Moreover, according to
Professor Smith, the notion that reform can bring about greater
equality pays insufficient attention to the reality that race itself is a
speech resource for voters of color that is very much analogous to
money, yet expression through race is overregulated in the
political process while money is underregulated. Given the
baseline differential in equality between whites and people of
color, greater equality through reform is only possible if citizens
of color are allowed to employ their full expressive resources in
the political process. The current legislative debates regarding
McCain-Feingold do not address the unique difficulties faced by
minority voters and candidates in the current system, and McCain-
Feingold may well increase barriers to their full participation.
This Article concludes by offering a set of "first principles"
regarding race and campaign finance reform, principles which if
* Copyright © 2001 Terry Smith, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law. A.B. 1986, Brown University; J.D. 1989, New York University School of
Law. A draft of this paper was presented at a faculty workshop at Roger Williams Law
School. I am grateful to its participants for their incisive feedback. Thanks also to
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effectively implemented through the legislative process or
otherwise may resound to the benefit of voters of color.
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In Warren Beatty's Bulworth, Senator Jay Bulworth is a dated,
erstwhile liberal attempting to dissemble himself in neo-conservative,
"New Democrat" clothing in order to withstand a primary challenge.
Suicidally depleted by the whole charade as well as by the money
chase of politics in general, Bulworth finds a political and spiritual
elixir in the socially disrupted, rap-saturated ghettos of Los Angeles.
It is there that he witnesses the gratuitous brutality of white cops
against black youths and is lectured on the life-and-death economics
of an inner-city drug trade which, on one view of it, offers the most
discrimination-free employment available to black youngsters.
The abandoned inner city and its dark inhabitants are curious
vehicles for the mantra of Bulworth's campaign: campaign finance
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reform. Or are they? Senator Bulworth, who is white and has
become moderately well-off, rationalizes the linkage between the
plight of black urbanites and campaign finance reform: "Rich people
have always stayed on top by dividing white people from colored
people. But white people got more in common with colored people
than they do with rich people."' But do they? Bulworth, like other
advocates of campaign finance reform, appropriates the cloak and
legacy of political inequality that are the reality of black2 political life
in order to crystallize the perceived need for campaign finance
reform.3 The attempted metaphor should seem unexceptional in an
age in which whites routinely equate their political and
socioeconomic circumstances with the historical discrimination
experienced by racial minorities.4 The fictional Bulworth's crusade,
his uncouth attempt to marry clean politics and racial justice, appears,
at least superficially, to diverge from this broader cycle in American
politics in which whites arrogate the political shoes of blacks for
narrow, self-interested purposes, but abandon them when a broader
application of the principles they advance would threaten racial
hegemony. Instead, Bulworth challenges the false consciousness of
working and middle class whites that he claims permits money to
unduly influence the current electoral process.
Fiction, of course, always has the luxury of eliding tough
questions. Thus, when Bulworth proposes a "voluntary, free-spirited,
open-ended program of racial deconstruction '' 6 in which we rid our
1. BULWORTH (Twentieth Century Fox 1998).
2. As is my custom, I use black, minority, and people of color interchangeably,
recognizing fully that in some cases, the interests of Latinos and Asians do not converge
with those of blacks.
3. See, e.g., John C. Bonifaz, "Not the Rich, More Than the Poor": Poverty, Race and
Campaign Finance Reform (Sept./Oct. 1999), at http://www.prrac.orgltopics/
sep99/bonifaz.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (analogizing modem
campaign finance barriers to the poll taxes that disproportionately disenfranchised
African Americans).
4. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that employers' voluntary affirmative action programs under Title
VII subjected white males to a "powerful engine of racism and sexism").
5. For example, in Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000), the Supreme Court found
that a manual recount of undercounted votes in the absence of a uniform statewide
standard violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 532. Yet because the undercounted
votes resided primarily in minority precincts, see Katherine Q. Seelye, Divided Civil Rights
Panel Approves Election Report: Racial Disparities on Vote Rejections Noted, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2001 at A8 (reporting that, according to findings of the United States Civil Rights
Commission, ballots cast by black Floridians were nearly seven times more likely to be
rejected), the Court's blockage of a recount amounted to the use of the Equal Protection
Clause to deprive voters of color of their franchise.
6. BULwORTH, supra note 1.
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nomenclature of racial categories, we awaken to a rash of difficult
questions about the intersection of race and money in politics, and
indeed, about the extent to which the use of race in politics has
allowed money its present reign. Equality may be an animating
principle for campaign finance reform,7 but even if money were
removed from politics, race would still remain. Race, like money,
miscues the electorate to behave in ways that are less than public-
regarding. Race, like money, hinders democratic pluralism, each
ceding the political realm to subordinating elites. Moreover, while
whites may have more in common with blacks than with rich people,
white political life is not about who white people are, but rather who
they insist on differentiating themselves from-blacks.8  White
political life is also about who white people are assured of never
being-black. Thus, despite the interest of some reformers in
"see[ing] wealth stand alone as a classification," 9 the bridge that they
and the fictional Bulworth have attempted to construct between
antisubordination and money in politics could ultimately prove too
narrow a passage unless the political realities of race are central to its
creation. In short, money may enable race, and race may enable
money in our political process.
Fictional and half-baked though it may be, Bulworth raises these
difficult questions both directly and implicitly. Art is not law, but
sometimes it can inform the law. In this vein, this Article picks up
where Hollywood left off, but with what will hopefully be viewed as
possessing more analytical rigor. This Article deconstructs and then
recasts the concept of equality as it is used in the context of campaign
finance reform, taking account of the race-bound definitions of
equality. Broadly speaking, it does so by asking, first, are white
voters disenfranchised, and if so, how so? Second, is the political
reality of black voters sufficiently different from that of whites such
that the political equality campaign finance reformers envision might
mean something different for whites than for people of color?
Finally, if white disenfranchisement is different-or even non-
existent-and this difference affects campaign finance reform's
7. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform,
94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1370 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended
Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390,1392 (1994).
8. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION,
AND DEMOCRACY 100-01 (1992) (discussing the out-group status of blacks and the
exploitation of that status in campaigns to prime white stereotypes of blacks).
9. John White, The Campaign Finance System and Its Impact on Candidates of Color
as a Civil Rights Issue, 43 How. L.J. 12,26 (1999).
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effectiveness relative to different racial groups, how should we
conceptualize campaign finance reform to make it more inclusive?
These broad queries are addressed in three parts. Part I of this
Article discusses how the very equality arguments that reformers
have advanced on behalf of campaign finance reform have been
employed against black political aspirations, creating an inequality
along racial lines which changes the assumptions and effect of
campaign finance reform for voters of color versus white voters. Part
II explores the extent to which race acts as a speech resource for
voters of color that is analogous to money and suggests that, given
this parallel, the Supreme Court has either overregulated race or
underregulated money in the political arena, or perhaps has
committed both missteps. Part III provides a racial critique of the
politics on the ground in the current campaign finance movement,
looking specifically at some of its principal architects, opponents, and
the centerpiece legislation of the movement, the McCain-Feingold
bill, as well as probing the extent to which the debate has
essentialized voters notwithstanding the significant differences
created by race.
I. RACE, MONEY AND SKEPTICISM: THREE CLAIMS
Many minorities, women, and working class citizens feel
stigmatized and excluded by the operation of the private
campaign finance system, which benefits the wealthy, who
are disproportionately white and male.10
I think I'd be a great Senator.... [B]ut the price that I
have to pay to get there, or anybody has to pay to get there is
just too enormous.... [T]here aren't 500 people in my
district who have a disposable grand."
Permit me-at least for the moment-to dispense with some of
the more widely held, though still contestable, premises of the debate
concerning campaign finance reform and its impact on people of
color. Let's take as given that: (1) minorities constitute a
disproportionate share of the poor,2 who in turn are most
10. Jamin B. Raskin, The Supreme Court's Racial Double Standard in Redistricting:
Unequal Protection in Politics and The Scholarship That Defends It, 14 J.L. & POL. 591,
630 (1998).
11. Congressman Jesse Jackson Jr., The Campaign Finance System and Its Impact on
Candidates of Color as a Civil Rights Issue, 43 How. L.J. 12,39 (1999).
12. The poverty rate for white Americans is 11%, while the poverty rate for African
Americans and Latinos is 27% each. Bonifaz, supra note 3.
2001] 1473
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disadvantaged by the current system of private contributions;13 (2)
minorities, because they constitute a disproportionate share of the
poor, are least likely to make campaign contributions to candidates;
14
and (3) minority candidates are less well funded because the
disproportionately white contributors to campaigns tend to
discriminate (loosely speaking) in their giving.15
From these premises, it may well follow perforce that campaign
finance is a civil rights issue and that reform will resound to the
13. The paucity of candidates who hail from the poor or working class and who
champion these groups' interests is one manifestation of this disadvantage. See Terry
Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, 100 CoLUM. L. REv. 845, 864-65 (2000); see
also ANTHONY CORRADO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 34 (2000) ("[M]any individuals
lack the resources and personal contacts needed to generate the hundreds of thousands of
dollars now required for most House races. These potential candidates are thus
effectively priced out of the market, which reduces the pool of citizens capable of
mounting bids for our nation's highest offices and significantly reduces the choices
available to the electorate."). Some rebut this claim. Bradley Smith, for example, has
criticized overhaul proposals for what he maintains is their tendency to disadvantage
"working people" who would not be able to volunteer their time to campaigns in lieu of
giving money. Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, And
Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 91 (1997). Smith ignores the likely reality that under
the current system the overwhelming majority of working people give neither money,
which they lack, nor time-because they are too busy working.
14. See PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
AND RACE 37 (1998), available at http://www.publiccampaign.orglcolorofmoney
(reporting that substantially fewer and smaller campaign contributions for federal
candidates come from zip code areas in which people of color comprise 50% or more of
the population) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). A 1990 demographic
profile of individual contributors revealed that 92.1% were white. See FRANK J. SORAUF,
INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 34 (1992).
15. See Robert Moore, Short Changed: Race and Campaign Finance Reform (Aug. 24,
2000), at http://www.innercitynews.com/speciareport- from-the-nnpa-invhtm (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). This report contains some startling findings that
inferentially support this supposition. First, as of June 2000, more than $1.2 billion had
been raised for the 2000 federal elections, yet black House candidates (both incumbents
and challengers) had received only $11.7 million, or less than 1%. Ld. More than one
million individual contributions had been made to political parties and congressional and
presidential candidates as of June 2000 for the 2000 elections, yet black candidates had
received only approximately 15,000 contributions, about 1.5% of the total. ld. Party
committees had allocated just $29,006 to black candidates. Id.
An earlier and more comprehensive study of campaign contributions in
congressional races during the 1980s confirms the inference of the NNPA report. In this
earlier report, John Theilmann and Al Wilhite found "a pattern of racial discrimination in
the allocation of total campaign contributions." JOHN THEILMANN & AL WILHITE,
DISCRIMINATION AND CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 78 (1991). The
authors' study controlled for variables such as candidate strength, opposition strength,
party affiliation, and incumbency. Id. They concluded that "[b]ecause the primary
determinants of candidates' fund-raising abilities are included in the analysis, the [funding]
differential appears to be racially motivated." Id.
For a more detailed discussion of these and other findings regarding contributions
to minority candidates, see infra Part III.
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benefit of minorities, though the details of reform may be quite
consequential. No argument from me. Instead, I want to advance
three potentially complicating claims, claims that may enhance the
foregoing premises but which also raise questions, the answers to
which I do not purport to fully know. The first such complicating
claim has to do with the equality arguments which animate campaign
finance reform as a civil rights issue. Many of the equal protection
analogies made in the campaign finance area also have been made,
but have failed, in the voting rights context. While trying again has
never hurt, the upshot of potential success in the campaign finance
context may well be to lay bare the reality that equality means
something different for poor and middle class whites than for poor
and middle class blacks because racial inequality, effectuated under
the guise of equal protection, has created a different benchmark.16
A second claim follows from the first. Part of what equal
protection has not been allowed to remedy effectively is white voter
resistance to candidates of color, a resistance fueled by racial cuing in
both campaigns and in the media. Money turns out to be a major
culprit in the perpetuation of this phenomenon because much of what
it buys, whether in bi-racial or same-race contests, is a color-coded
political message that has become a dominant backdrop in American
politics. 17  Perhaps not coincidentally, the same voters-white
voters-who prove susceptible to such racial messages also prove
more susceptible to the more general evil thought to be perpetuated
by too much money in politics: television advertising.'8 Voters of
color and whites may be victimized by an excess of money in politics,
but they are victimized in different ways and have different degrees of
culpability for their respective harms.' 9
Finally, if racial difference is consequential both in terms of
defining inequality and examining money's effect across demographic
groups, then it is likely relevant in defining the equality that campaign
finance reform might achieve. This invites a third complicating claim:
If policy preferences and priorities are marked by racial schisms, then
the morning after reform, race will remain as a barrier to equality for
the very citizens whose history has provided the model for the
campaign finance reform movement.20
16. See infra notes 21-58 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 59-98 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 59-98 and accompanying text
19. See infra notes 59-98 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
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A. Unequal Inequality
Buckley v. Valeo21 is a jarring setback to those who view money's
influence on the political process as creating unequal citizenship. In
declaring limitations on campaign expenditures verboten, the
Supreme Court in Buckley inscribed on the First Amendment a
decidedly inegalitarian cast: "[T]he concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment .... ,22 Yet both before and after Buckley's rejection of
equality as a compelling interest for restricting expenditures,
campaign finance advocates had looked to other constitutional
provisions, principally the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, for justification for limiting both contributions and
expenditures in the name of political equality. While relying on
Fourteenth Amendment precedent with varying degrees of racial
overtones, these advocates fail to appreciate the role of race in
defining political equality in the context of campaign finance. Race
complicates the definition, not merely because blacks are poorer, but
rather because the very equal protection principles advocates
advance in favor of campaign finance reform have themselves been
inverted to create the racial inequality that ultimately renders reform
less meaningful for people of color.
Early scholarship advocating the application of the Equal
Protection Clause to campaign finance appeared to hedge the
question of race and focus instead on wealth differences. In 1974,
Professor Marlene Nicholson identified the intended class of
beneficiaries of an equal protection critique of an electoral system
financed by private contributions as "all persons so poor that they are
unable to make contributions of sufficient size to have substantial
multiple vote and multiple representation effects."'  That this class
may consist of persons whose perceived and/or actual political
interests are hostile, namely poor whites and poor blacks, does not
detain Nicholson. Instead, she fluidly analogizes the plight of the less
wealthy in the campaign finance context to Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment precedents which upon closer scrutiny have racial
21. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
22. Id. at 48-49.
23. Marlene A. Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 815, 830 (1974). Multiple votes result from the ability of wealthy contributors to
influence the outcome of elections beyond merely casting a ballot; multiple representation
ensues from multiple voting because wealthy contributors are given additional access to
lawmakers and in some cases receive preferential legislation. Id. at 820-21.
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overtones that unmask the over-simplification of her intended class of
beneficiaries.
In invoking, for instance, the Supreme Court's one person, one
vote jurisprudence as a justification for congressional regulation of
campaign contributions, 24 Nicholson elides both the racialized factual
context that gave rise to this renowned legal principle and the
hollowness of the principle where racial factions exist within equi-
populous electoral units. In Reynolds v. Sims,25 white voters in the
rural "Black Belt" districts who benefited from the over-
concentration of voters in suburban districts did so because blacks in
the rural districts were disenfranchised.2 6 The plaintiffs who sought
numerical parity among Alabama's legislative districts were white
suburbanites.27 The Court's failure to reckon with the group
disenfranchisement of rural blacks rendered its remedy for white
suburbanites of equi-populous districts illusory, because "[t]he
'weight' of a white vote in a remedial district with a heavily black
[disenfranchised] population would be greater than that of a white
vote in a heavily white district."28 Even when taking cognizance of
black disenfranchisement would have actually benefited the majority
of white voters, the Court failed to do so.
Even if the specific remedy of equi-populous districts did not
benefit blacks, the principle of Reynolds nevertheless held promise.
In finding for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court rested its decision on
the principles that "each and every citizen has an inalienable right to
full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's
legislative bodies," and that "[f]ull and effective participation by all
citizens in state government requires... that each citizen have an
equally effective voice in the election of members of his state
legislature. '29 Yet when confronted with these very same principles
in cases in which black voters alleged unconstitutional dilution of
their votes as black citizens, the Court saddled its one person, one
vote precept with complexities of discriminatory intent30 and sophistic
24. Id. at 821 & n.36.
25. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
26. Barbara Y. Phillips, Reconsidering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its Basic
Standard of Equality to Other Vote Dilution Claims, 38 How. LJ. 561,566 (1995).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 585 n.21.
29. 377 U.S. at 565.
30. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) ("[T]here is no suggestion here
that Marion County's multi-member district, or similar districts throughout the State, were
conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial or economic
discrimination."); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(requiring purposeful invidious intent "to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of
14772001]
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distinctions between partisan versus racial discrimination in the
electoral process. 31 Whatever the one person, one vote analogy to
campaign finance may mean for white voters, when one considers the
failure of this principle to effectuate political equality on its original
terms for voters of color, we may fairly question the impact of its
importation into the campaign finance arena for minorities.32
Bullock v. Carter?3 is likewise a staple of the equality arguments
on behalf of campaign finance reform. In Bullock, the Supreme
Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a primary election
filing fee that required candidates to pay upwards of $6,300 to gain
access to the primary ballot3 The Court examined the fee system
under heightened scrutiny because "the very size of the fees imposed
under the Texas system gives it a patently exclusionary character"
and thus has "a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the
franchise."'35 In finding that Texas could not justify its fee system as a
law reasonably necessary to accomplish legitimate state objectives,
the Court rejected claims that the fee system was necessary to prevent
ballot cluttering and relieve the treasury of the cost of conducting
primaries. 6
In their widely cited 1993 critique of the current system of
private campaign contributions,37 Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz
read Bullock as a recognition by the Court of "nonaffluent citizens as
a group with common interests in the political process."38 And in her
earlier analysis of Bullock, Nicholson finds an acknowledgment by
racial or ethnic minorities").
31. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 154 ("But are poor Negroes of the ghetto any more
underrepresented than poor ghetto whites who also voted Democratic and lost, or any
more discriminated against than other interest groups or voters in Marion County with
allegiance to the Democratic Party, or, conversely, any less represented than Republican
areas or voters in years of Republican defeat? We think not."). For an analysis of how
race in fact tracks partisanship and vice versa, see Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics:
Senate Districts, Minority Vote Dilution and the Preservation of the Second Reconstruction,
25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277,323-43 (1998).
32. Thus Judge Skelly Wright's declaration that the role of money in politics was
rendering the one person, one vote principle a "hollow mockery," see J. Skelly Wright,
Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political
Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 609 (1982), fails to take stock of the faintness of that
principle for voters of color to begin with.
33. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
34. Id. at 149.
35. Id. at 143-44.
36. Id. at 145-48.
37. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 273 (1993).
38. Id. at 287.
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the Court of "the importance of economic class representation." 39
Taken as statements of case interpretation, these readings seem fair,
if not incontrovertible. Taken, however, in the more concretized
context of political equality for blacks, these interpretations have
problematical implications. Bullock treated the right to vote as
fundamental and correctly found the fee requirement a substantial
burden on that right. There was little dispute that the fee created a
disparity in voting power, giving affluent voters who could contribute
the fee to their chosen candidate the opportunity to vote for that
candidate while poor citizens could not similarly fund a standard
bearer. The Court found this disparity subject to heightened scrutiny
and ultimately invalidated the scheme even though "disparity in
voting power based on wealth cannot be described by reference to
discrete and precisely defined segments of the community as is typical
of inequities challenged under the Equal Protection Clause."'4
When presented, however, with a claim that Mobile, Alabama's
at-large procedure for electing city commissioners discriminated
against black voters in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments,4" a plurality of the Court, notwithstanding the
fundamental right involved, denied relief, claiming that it needed a
discrete and precisely defined group after all. Justice Marshall argued
in his dissent that because black voters claimed that the at-large
system unconstitutionally diluted their fundamental right to vote, no
showing of intent was necessary, as would be the case if only suspect
class discrimination were alleged.42 The plurality, however, failed to
perceive "how the implications of the dissenting opinion's theory of
group representation could rationally be cabined.' '43 Posing a series
of hypothetical questions that purported to demonstrate the unwieldy
effects of treating blacks as a political, rather than a racial, group
whose fundamental right to vote had been burdened,"4 the plurality
abandoned the premise of Bullock, even as it purported to recognize
that "the right of a person to vote on an equal basis with other voters
39. Nicholson, supra note 23, at 826 (expressing dismay that a conservative Court,
such as the Burger Court, would introduce economic class representation as an important
factor).
40. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
41. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,58 (1980) (plurality opinion).
42. Id at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur vote-dilution decisions require only a
showing of discriminatory impact to justify the invalidation of a multimember districting
scheme, and, because they are premised on the fundamental interest in voting protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, the discriminatory-impact standard adopted by them is
unaffected by Washington v. Davis and its progeny.").
43. Id at 78-79 n.26 (plurality opinion).
44. Id. (plurality opinion).
20011 1479
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draws much of its significance from the political associations that its
exercise reflects."'45 As they do with Reynolds v. Sims,46 in relying on
Bullock advocates of campaign finance reform implicitly argue that a
principle that has not been permitted to protect black voters as such
can address their inequality in the context of campaign finance.47
Raskin and Bonifaz have made somewhat narrower use of the
Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Adams.48 Terry is more
explicitly racialized than either Reynolds v. Sims or Bullock v. Carter.
In Terry, the Court struck down on Fifteenth Amendment grounds a
Byzantine local election system in Texas in which a nominally private
association conducted a whites-only pre-primary that effectively
dictated the outcome of the formal state-run Democratic primary.
The defendants contended that the so-called Jaybird primary, the
antecedent contest, did not constitute state action because it was run
by private citizens. The Court rejected this argument because as a
factual matter the Jaybird primary had become so intertwined with
the Democratic primary, dictating its outcome, that its operation
discriminated against black voters in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment.49 Raskin and Bonifaz employ Terry to remove the
state-action hurdle from an equal protection challenge to the current
system of privately financed campaigns, which they deem a "wealth
primary. '" 50  According to Raskin and Bonifaz, "[t]he critical
importance of the wealth primary to election results should be
enough to warrant constitutional scrutiny even though the process of
private fund-raising assumes the form of voluntary association of
unofficial character."51
Terry and the other White Primary cases52 are important
contributions in defining an expansive doctrine of state action, one
that is perhaps sufficiently broad to allow a challenge to the current
campaign finance system of private contributions. Terry, however, is
45. Id. at 78 (plurality opinion).
46. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
47. Moreover, because the basic rationale of Bullock derived from the Court's
Fourteenth Amendment cases striking down poll taxes used to perpetuate black
disenfranchisement, its extension to campaign finance and its rejection in the more race-
specific context of Bolden underscore a more fundamental neglect of black interests.
48. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
49. Id. at 469-70.
50. Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 37, at 306-12.
51. Id. at 309 (internal quotations omitted); see also Nicholson, supra note 23, at 831-
32 (arguing based on Terry that the current privately funded campaign finance system
constitutes state action).
52. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45
(1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
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also a striking affirmation of Madisonian pluralism, for it "established
a rule against invidious discrimination where party processes, even
nominally private ones, intersect with the right to vote so as to
prevent the effective exercise of that right."53 Rather than employ
Terry's rule against invidious discrimination to encourage pluralism in
the political process (a value that, incidentally, animates the Court's
disallowance of campaign expenditure limitations54), the Court has
used the rule as a tool of retrenchment against minority aspirations
for political power, particularly in the redistricting context.55 Thus,
even though Terry has not been permitted to augment minority
political power beyond the right not to be excluded from party
primaries, the implicit promise of reformers is that it will assist in
doing precisely that in the even less analogous context of campaign
finance.
This claim, as well as arguments based on one person, one vote
principles and protections against wealth discrimination, are all
plausible. The Court's refusal to extend or consistently apply the
principles on which these cases rest does not definitively portend that
it will do the same in the case of campaign finance. Moreover, the
commentators who invoke these principles are not blind to the
inequality of race, even if they do not draw the connection between
race and money. To his credit, for example, Professor Raskin has
been highly critical of the Supreme Court's racial gerrymandering
decisions,5 6 while at the same time vigorously advocating campaign
finance reform. And Cass Sunstein, another reformer, has offered a
unified theory of constitutional interpretation that evaluates both
affirmative action and campaign finance regulation in terms of the
degree to which the Fourteenth and First Amendments, respectively,
reject "status quo neutrality" that produces caste-like effects within
the polity 7 But a consistency across contexts does not recognize the
problematical nature of the intersection of race and money. 58 The
53. Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, supra note 13, at 849.
54. See id. at 857-60.
55. 1d at 850 (arguing that the Court's hyper-scrutiny of majority-minority
congressional districts in cases such as Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), departs from
Madisonian pluralism).
56. See generally Raskin, supra note 10 (criticizing current legislative redistricting for
dismantling majority-minority districts).
57. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 154,223-24,338-44 (1993).
58. Scholars' recognition of this intersection has so far been fleeting and superficial.
See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 37, at 332 n.26 (suggesting without detailed analysis that
the current campaign finance system of private contributions may discriminate against
minority candidates in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)
(1994)); see also Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1409-10 (demonstrating sensitivity to the
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Court's refusal to apply its Equal Protection and Fifteenth
Amendment jurisprudence consistently in the face of claims for black
political equality has created a baseline differential in the meaning of
political equality such that homogenized references to the poor or
middle class and their need for campaign finance reform are too facile
to be meaningful.
The different meanings of equality for different races of voters
raise a series of complex questions. What does it mean for white
voters, who are a controlling majority, to claim that they are unequal?
Does white inequality in the context of campaign finance reform
mean something different than claims of white inequality in the
Fourteenth Amendment context, claims which often are bottomed on
charges of "reverse discrimination"? Can we realistically equate
wealth inequality with racial inequality? Is there any codependency
between the two types of inequality-that is, within the context of
campaign finance reform, must one be eradicated in order to
successfully address the other? If wealth inequality's effect is to give
the wealthy greater access to the legislative process and more
favorable legislative outcomes, does not race inequality discriminate
in a similar way even in the absence of such a wealth effect? These
questions center on a reality to which reformers have thus far paid
insufficient attention: the meaning of political equality among
political unequals who are unequal for different reasons and to
different degrees. To begin to sort some of these complexities,
consider below a harm of money that is unique to voters of color, how
the vehicle for its perpetration-the mass media-causes a distinct
harm to white voters, and how reformers fail to appreciate the
divergent consequences occurring along a common axis.
B. Cues and Miscues
Imagine that the first Senate contest between Jesse Helms, the
ultra-conservative white Republican incumbent, and Harvey Gantt,
his black opponent and the former mayor of Charlotte, took place not
in our current campaign finance system but in a publicly funded one
advocated by, among others, Professor Jamin Raskin and attorney
John Bonifaz.59 Raskin and Bonifaz have argued that democratically
financed campaigns further the Equal Protection Clause's
question of race in the campaign finance reform debate by noting that the elimination of
political action committees (PACs) may harm some minority candidates "who can succeed
only with the help of PACs specifically organized for their particular benefit").
59. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 passim (1994).
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requirement that "all citizens enjoy sufficient equality in the political
field to participate meaningfully in public elections as voters,
speakers, and candidates whenever they so desire.' 6°  Meaningful
participation, they appear to suggest, is not limited to having the
opportunity to vote for candidates of varied socioeconomic
backgrounds but also encompasses a correlative right of equal
representation. 61  The praxis of the Raskin/Bonifaz theory has
resulted in equal protection challenges to such varied offices as
congressional elections in New York,62 state senate elections in
Georgia,63 and judicial elections in Los Angeles County, California. 61
Even in the more antiseptic world of democratically financed
elections, however, an often formidable nemesis would have reared
its head in the Helms/Gantt contest. Ten days before election day,
Gantt was leading, and Helms broadcast a controversial television ad,
which:
showed the plaid-shirted arms and white hands of a male, a
simple gold wedding ring on the third finger of his left hand,
opening, presumably reading, and then crumbling a rejection
letter as the announcer says "You needed that job, and you
were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a minority
because of a racial quota. Is that really fair? Harvey Gantt
says it is. Gantt supports Ted Kennedy's racial quota law
that makes the color of your skin more important than your
qualifications. You'll vote on this issue next Tuesday. For
racial quotas: Harvey Gantt. Against racial quotas: Jesse
Helms."65
Helms went on to win the contest with 52.5% of the vote, and
focus groups of North Carolina voters questioned about that ad
suggest that it and other anti-affirmative action ads by Helms were
effective, if not decisive.' The closeness of the race despite Gantt's
monetary disadvantage67 underscores a fact to which reformers pay
60. Id. at 1164.
61. Id. at 1167, 1179.
62. See Albanese v. FEC, 884 F. Supp. 685,687 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
63. See Ga. State Conference of NAACP v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999).
64. See NAACP v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317,1320 (9th Cir. 1997).
65. JAMIESON, supra note 8, at 97.
66. Id. at 97-100; Carol M. Swain, Affirmative Action Revisited, in RACE VERSUS
CLASS: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 34 (Carol M. Swain ed., 1996).
67. Federal Election Commission records reveal that Gantt's total receipts from
individual and political action committee contributions were $7,856,827, the highest
amount raised by a challenger during the 1989-90 election cycle. See Federal Election
Commission, Press Release, 1990 Congressional Candidates Post Spending Drop, Final
FEC Report Shows, Dec. 10, 1991, at 24. This compared with $13,329,025 raised by
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insufficient attention: Money matters, but the messages that money
buys and who those messages galvanize voters against are as relevant
an issue for people of color as money itself.' In a world where
partisan identification serves a decreased role as an electoral cue for
white voters,69 the symbolic content of what money purchases,
particularly when it is imbued with race, supplies a premise for
reform that differentiates along racial lines. For white voters, the
immediacy of campaign finance may have less to do with curing the
ills of blighted ghettos, as Bulworth suggests, and more to do with
saving these voters from their own impulses.
Few dispute the proposition that the cost of television advertising
drives the rapid increases in campaign costs and the corresponding
money chase,70 but the cost of television and the resultant lack of
equal access to this medium are not the sole culprits in the eyes of
many reformers. Instead, as Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Pam
Karlan have observed:
Helms, the largest sum raised by any incumbent. Id. In terms of independent
expenditures by groups nominally unaffiliated with either campaign, Helms had the
largest amount of independent expenditures spent against him of any congressional
candidate and the second largest amount spent on his behalf. IM at 12.
68. I do not mean to suggest that additional funding would not have been helpful to
Gantt in responding to and overcoming Helms's spurious claims. But we simply must
appreciate that race has force independent of, and often times greater than, money. Thus,
although a progressive incumbent Democrat, Governor Ray Mabus of Mississippi,
outspent his challenger by five to one, the challenger, running on a race-laden platform of
repealing the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and having prison inmates work in cotton fields,
unseated Mabus. JAMIESON, supra note 8, at 93. And although the incumbent Democrat
J. Bennett Johnston of Louisiana out-fundraised his white-supremacist opponent, David
Duke, by almost $1.5 million in their 1990 Senate contest, see Federal Election
Commission, Press Release, supra note 67, at 24, Duke still captured a majority of white
votes. See 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 916 (1990) (reporting that Duke is estimated to have
won 60% of the white vote).
69. See KAREN S. JOHNSON-CARTEE & GARY A. COPELAND, INSIDE POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 98-99 (1997) ("[The] reduction in party influence
has led to an elevation of the power of the media and particularly of television in
influencing elections.") (citation omitted); BRUCE E. KEITH ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE
INDEPENDENT VOTER 31 (1992) (noting that blacks are substantially less likely to call
themselves independents than whites).
70. HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLITICS 32-33 (1972) (noting the rise in
campaign broadcasting costs throughout the 1950s and 1960s); DARRELL M. WEST, AIR
WARS: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, 1952-1996, at 17 (2d ed.
1997) ("[A]dvertising represents the largest single expenditure in most contemporary
campaigns .... "); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 663, 684-85 (1997) (reciting, with disapproval, the arguments of critics
who call for expenditure limits in order to curtail the influence of television advertising by
campaigns and force candidates to use less expensive, more informative channels of
communication).
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The reformers' agenda is driven by the image of a quite
different consumer of political news, sitting in his arm chair
in front of a quite different screen. Most of the money that
they see as having corrupted our political system goes into
television spots, particularly emotional attack advertising.
The thoughtful citizen can simply disregard these noxious
offerings or turn off the TV.... But the reformers must
believe that most voters are not thoughtful citizens....
Thus, money, in the guise of spending on substantively
vacuous mass media advertising, distorts the election process
by influencing how these slackers cast their ballots.... The
real problem is that spots are an effective way of reaching
the affective voter; money in the system allows this to
happen.
71
Issacharoff and Karlan are skeptical that this republican-
communitarian perspective of campaign finance actually breeds
equality. In fact, they claim, it unjustifiably privileges deliberative
speech over affective speech and unfairly disadvantages the
commodification of money in the political process relative to other
political resources.72  Loosely analogizing the republican-
communitarian view of campaign finance reform to the
antidemocratic practices of poll taxes, property qualifications and the
exclusion of racial and gender groups, Professor Daniel Ortiz makes a
similar observation about the potential inequality wrought by
campaign finance reform.73 According to Oritz:
[C]ampaign finance regulation does frustrate certain voters
from exercising choice in ways they otherwise would and
minimizes the overall effect of their votes if they do. In a
sense, then, campaign finance regulation is to many of these
practices as racial gerrymandering is to outright racial
exclusion. Like racial gerrymandering, campaign finance
regulation does not bar anyone from voting, but it does
dilute the effect of certain votes: the votes of those who
respond to politics in certain disfavored ways....
Regulation starves these voters of the stimulus to which they
are most likely to respond or at least makes sure that all the
71. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705,1727 (1999).
72. Id. at 1727-31.
73. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN.
L. REv. 893, 905-10 (1998).
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candidates can make a roughly equal number of such
appeals. 74
In offering inequality as a downside to the regulation of money
in politics, however, perhaps Issacharoff, Karlan, and Oritz pay too
little heed to the racial inequality that money perpetuates. The
infamous Willie Horton television spot from the 1988 presidential
campaign was financed by an independent expenditure made on
behalf of the George Bush campaign which current law leaves
unchecked.75 The inequality it perpetuated was not merely a resource
differential in which one party or candidate is able to outspend the
other with the aid of nominally unaffiliated groups,76 but a racial
inequality:
Owing to Horton's visage, made clear in 'Weekend Passes'
and network news coverage, skin color was an obvious factor
in how voters saw the crime spree. Republicans had picked
the perfect racial offense, that of a black felon raping a white
woman.
Experimental research demonstrates that viewers saw the
story as involving race more than crime. According to
researchers, the ad 'mobilized whites' racial prejudice, not
their worries about crime.' Viewers became much more
likely to feel negatively about blacks in general after having
heard the details of the case.
77
Nor is the Willie Horton episode atypical of the racial inequality
that money perpetuates through the electoral process. Racial cuing-
"the articulation of racial meaning and identities in conflictual, albeit
somewhat masked terms"--continues to be a significant strategy in
American politics.78 Moreover, such appeals often take forms that
74. Id. at 910.
75. See DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK DEMOCRACY: How MONEY CORRUPTS
GOVERNMENT 16-38 (2000).
76. See id. at 38 (discussing the problems associated with one candidate having more
resources than the other).
77. Id. at 30-31 (footnotes omitted); see also JAMIESON, supra note 8, at 24 ("It is no
accident that the image chosen by the Republicans to symbolize the Massachusetts
furlough system was a black male.").
78. Howard Winant, Postmodern Racial Politics in the United States: Difference and
Inequality, in THE POLITICS OF RACE: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM 55, 61 (Theodore Rueter ed., 1995); see also KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR
FEARS? WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES & RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 45-47
(1997). In addition to exploring racial appeals by candidates themselves-appeals which
Reeves defines as simply calling the public's attention to the race of one's opponent-
Reeves explores the extent to which the media, through its gratuitous mention of a
candidate's race, inadvertently engages in racial cuing. Id.
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are more subtle than the Willie Horton advertisement, dissembling
themselves in Aesopian terms to avoid political opprobrium, but all
the while appealing to a latent racism in many white voters.7 9 When a
Nixon for President commercial claimed that the country had been
deluged with programs for the unemployed and the poor and that it
was time to take people from welfare rolls and place them on
payrolls, "[i]t would appear that Nixon meant to keep poor and black
America separate from middle America, and he was signaling middle
America that, if elected, he would 'protect' them from the welfare
cheats, youthful hoods, and other shiftless people on the dole."80 Is
race not at work when Bernard Epton, a white candidate challenging
Harold Washington, a black congressman, for mayor of Chicago ends
his commercials with "Epton-Before It's Too Late"?81 And when
Peter Fitzgerald, running against Carol Moseley-Braun, the first
African-American woman ever elected to the United States Senate,
airs television advertisements implying that his opponent had
misappropriated campaign funds to purchase luxury personal items
despite the absence of any such determination by the relevant
investigative authorities,8 his message is one of black criminality and
profligacy as much as anything else.m3
79. See JEFF MANZA & CLEM BROOKS, SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 157 (1999). Manza and Brooks write:
[D]irect appeals along race lines, common between the 1940s and the 1960s,
are now increasingly rare. The race divide has instead become more subtle,
manifesting itself in coded or symbolic forms, in recent decades. Many analysts
have demonstrated the powerful effects of racial attitudes in structuring whites'
political behavior.... Although this literature spans several divergent
theoretical perspectives, the most widely held view is that a 'new' or 'subtle
racism' has emerged in recent decades. In contrast to earlier racial belief
systems, this form of racism affirms individualistic principles of freedom and
equal opportunity while simultaneously opposing the implementation of policies
designed to achieve racial equality.
IL (footnote omitted).
80. ROBERT SPERO, THE DUPING OF THE AMERICAN VOTER: DISHONESTY AND
DECEPTION IN PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION ADVERTISING 96-98 (1980).
81. JAMIESON, supra note 8, at 109.
82. Mary Jacoby, '98 is not Sen. Moseley-Braun's Year, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct.
31, 1998, at 1A, LEXIS, St. Petersburg Times File.
83. That Fitzgerald ran his campaign with race in mind is evidenced by his infelicitous
victory speech on election night. Further perpetuating his theme that the black
incumbent, Carol Moseley-Braun, had paid too much attention to the city of Chicago
(which, perhaps only coincidentally, has a large black and Hispanic population), Fitzgerald
said then that he would represent "all colors, all ages, the young and old, the people who
live on our farms, in our small towns and our big cities." Flynn McRoberts & Bob
Kemper, Democrats Gain Nationally; Republican Ousts 1-Term Incumbent, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 4, 1998, § 1, at 1. Money assisted Fitzgerald greatly in carrying his message.
Fitzgerald, a man of considerable personal fortune, outspent Moseley-Braun by a
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The reform that Oritz and others may characterize as an
impingement on equality-namely the right of the voter to consume
freely whatever a campaign wishes to communicate, however it
wishes to communicate it-has direct victims. They are society's out-
groups, racial minorities against whom there exists latent and overt
antipathy ready to be tapped by the expenditure of money on ads
ranging from Willie Horton to more subtle but equally insidious fare.
I am not suggesting that the government could or should outlaw
Willie Horton-type demagoguery.' I do mean, however, to portray
the racially different ways in which money in politics harms voters.
For racial minorities, the harm is a classic perpetuation of their status
as a "discrete and insular" minority, disfavored by society at large.
But if some commentators have overemphasized campaign finance
reform's potential burden on equality, reformers themselves appear
to have underappreciated the racial difference in the harm of the
current system. To speak generically of civic slackers making bad
judgments from bad information consumed from thirty-second spots
on television ignores the reality of to whom those spots are directed.
Not black voters. Between 80 and 90% of all campaign resources are
spent in pursuit of so-called "persuadable voters."8 5 "A persuadable
voter is generally defined as one who has voted in the past few
elections and has had a history of splitting his or her ballot.... [T]he
voter is 'pursuable' because (a) this person does vote and (b) this
person has not exhibited past loyalty to either party. '86 Given their
substantial margin. See Jacoby, supra note 82.
Criminality was also most recently the charge insinuated against a Latino
candidate, Antonio Villaraigosa, in the Los Angeles mayoral runoff. See David S.
Jackson, How the West Was Won, TIME, June 18, 2001, at 33. In that contest, the victor,
James Hahn, a white Democrat, ran a television ad featuring images of a crack-cocaine
pipe that discussed a 1996 letter that Villaraigosa wrote to the Clinton administration
seeking a presidential pardon for a convicted drug trafficker. The commercial's tagline:
"Los Angeles can't trust Antonio Villaraigosa." Id.
84. But see Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 449, 454-57 (arguing, within the context of racist
speech on college campuses, that a balancing of the speaker's First Amendment interests
with the constitutional harms visited upon the object of the speech supports limited
content regulation of certain racist speech).
85. PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES: RACE AND PARTY COMPETITION IN
AMERICA 127 (1999)..
86. Id. at 128; see also STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING
NEGATIVE: How ATrACK ADS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 97 (1995)
("Because Independents are less responsive to political appeals, candidates who face
increasingly nonpartisan constituencies must spend ever larger amounts of money simply
to persuade voters."); Richard L. Berke, Focusing on the Few, Blind to the Many, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (noting that Bush and Gore had "so
narrow-casted their message to a sliver of voters in swing states crucial for an electoral
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bedrock loyalty to (or captured status within) the Democratic Party,
blacks are largely excluded from this group. 7  Instead, as Gore-
Lieberman 2000 campaign manager Donna Brazile explained at a
recent forum on the 2000 contest, core constituencies such as blacks
are addressed with a "parallel strategy" while "the candidate is
focused on reaching out to suburbanites and independent, middle
class [voters]." 8
The wisdom of pursuing independent voters so intently is not my
immediate concern.89 Instead, the point is that if the republican-
communitarian description of the evil of money in politics is correct,
it is an evil that is aided and abetted by white voters who lack strong
ideological or partisan moorings. These voters may well be harmed
by the system that they unwittingly foster, but we should appreciate
that their "inequality"-the inequality of a white, controlling
majority-is different from the harm of money visited upon racial
minorities.
Money's harm to white voters may be appropriately analogized
to the term-limits movement. Courts have upheld term limits on state
and local elected officials against First Amendment attack on the
grounds that states have legitimate, if not compelling, interests in (1)
preventing unfair incumbency advantages through incumbent
entrenchment;9° (2) increasing voter participation in elections and
involvement in government;91 and (3) preserving the general integrity
of the electoral process.92 Commentators have observed that both
college victory that they have deserted the rest").
87. FRYMER, supra note 85, at 128.
88. Presidential Campaign Review (C-SPAN television broadcast, Jan. 26, 2001)
(Video Archives, Reference #162170). While Brazile credited this parallel strategy with
turning out the Democratic base in the 2000 elections, id., Gore's overarching aim of
reaching swing voters led him to neglect issues of special importance to African
Americans. See, e.g., Berke, supra note 86 (reporting that for the sake of garnering
undecided votes in swing states, Gore had declined to probe Bush's vulnerabilities on the
death penalty, such as the racial disparities in its application).
89. But see FRYMER, supra note 85, at 120, 131-37 (arguing that the failure of the
Democratic party to mobilize the black vote marginalizes the interests of blacks and
alienates them from the political process). As Frymer cogently notes,
When party leaders focus their appeals on white swing voters, those
messages, with their valorization of whites, are communicated to the national
electorate. Furthermore, when party leaders assume that messages focusing on
black concerns will detract from their pursuit of the median white voter, the
resulting silence regarding black concerns has significant consequences for
national behavior.
Id. at 120.
90. Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1997).
91. Ray v. Mortham, 742 So. 2d 1276, 1285 (Fla. 1999).
92. Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F. Supp. 816, 822 (S.D. Ohio 1993), affd, 45
2001] 1489
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
campaign finance reform and term limits are directed at similar
perceived evils.93 Although courts' analyses of term limits typically
assess their burdens on freedom of association rather than speech,94 it
is difficult to see how courts can forbid expenditure limitations as an
abridgement of speech while upholding term limits. Term limits on
state officeholders are nearly identical to limits on campaign
expenditures because political association itself often has some
expressive purpose.95 Term limits, like expenditure limits, permit
some expression but do not allow unlimited voice. While the
limitation on expression in the case of term limits is temporal rather
than monetary, this distinction cannot be legally significant, for in
both cases the quantity of expression is controlled. Likewise, it
cannot be legally controlling that in the case of term limits, the
expression occurs by running for office (in the case of the candidate)
or by voting (in the case of the candidate's supporters) rather than by
spending. Surely expression through voting should at least be on
constitutional par with expression by the expenditure of money.
Either expenditure limits are valid, or term limits are invalid.
Putting to one side their doctrinal parallels, the campaign finance
reform and term-limits movements also share an unflattering socio-
political premise: they both admit of a majority electorate (in this
case, predominated by white voters) who distrust their own decision-
making capabilities-for they could, after all, simply not vote for a
candidate who offends the principles of these two movements-and
F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1995).
93. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules As A
Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 365, 398 (1999) ("Proponents of
campaign finance reform attempt to restrain special interests by limiting campaign
contributions. Proponents of term limits try to solve the problem by curtailing the power
of long-term politicians who are likely to be beholden to special interests."); Sullivan,
supra note 70, at 686 (noting that some prominent advocates of campaign finance reform
as a tool against unfair incumbency advantage also support term limits); Steven G.
Calabresi, "The Era of Big Government Is Over", 50 STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (1998)
(reviewing ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF
THE CONSTITuTION (1997)) (noting that term limits and campaign finance reform could
make elections more competitive, though campaign finance reform is less likely to achieve
this goal and may well exacerbate the problem).
94. See, e.g., Ray, 742 So. 2d at 1285 ("Candidate qualification rules, such as term
limits, implicate the right to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right
of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively, which are rights protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.").
95. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (finding that congressional limits
on independent campaign expenditures "precludes most associations from effectively
amplifying the voice of their adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First
Amendment protection of freedom of association") (emphasis supplied).
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who, moreover, distrust the collective decision-making process of
voting.96
Black voters lack the power of a controlling white majority, and,
moreover, they often display a political judgment that is substantially
at variance with that of white voters.97 It is difficult, then, to ascribe
the same (self-inflicted) harms to them as may be attributed to white
voters.98 Instead, money harms voters of color by creating for them,
in the words of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, "less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice."99
C. The Morning After Reform
Race is constitutive of any definition of political equality,
whether that definition focuses on money's role in politics or any
other dimension of equality. As illustrated in Parts L.A and I.B race
not only establishes a distinctive baseline of political equality for
people of color, it also collaborates with money, " 'driv[ing] a wedge
through alliances of the working classes and the poor, and giv[ing]
both momentum and vitality to the drive to establish a national
majority inclined by income and demography to support policies
benefiting the affluent and the upper-middle class.' " Indeed, race
96. See, e.g., Robert Henry, Deliberations About Democracy: Revolutions,
Republicanism and Reform, 34 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 533, 574 (1998) ("The animating
force, besides occasional demagoguery, behind term limits is that you can fool most of the
people most of the time and that we cannot always rely on majority rule.").
97. In presidential contests from 1976 to 1996, blacks provided a minimum of 82% of
their votes to the Democratic candidates. Marjorie Connelly, Who Voted: A Portrait of
American Politics, 1976-2000, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4. In
contrast, in each of these same elections, white voters provided a majority or a plurality of
their votes to the Republican candidate. Id. This pattern persisted in the 2000
presidential contest, as Al Gore captured the votes of most black, Latino and Asian
voters, while George W. Bush carried the white vote. Id. Somewhat astonishingly,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525
(2000), while a majority of Americans accept George W. Bush as the legitimate president,
three-quarters of African Americans do not. See Richard L. Berke & Janet Elder, 60
Percent in Poll Approve of Bush Early in His Term, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at Al.
Perhaps no fact better underscores the dissonance between white and black voters.
98. Indeed, some have suggested that black voters are more politically sophisticated
than other social groups. See KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS: THE
NEW BLACK VOTERS IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 124 (1994) (citing I. A. Lewis & William
Schneider, Black Voting, Bloc Voting and the Democrats, in 6(5) PuB. OPINION 12-15, 59
(1983)).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
100. See JOHNSON-CARTEE & COPELAND, supra note 69, at 55 (quoting T.B. Edsall &
M.D. Edsall, Race, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 53 (May 1991)); see also Frances Lee Ansley,
Stirring The Ashes: Race, Class and The Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL
L. REv. 993, 1025-34 (1989) (discussing the conception of white supremacy as a tool that
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has played a critical role in the creation of the basic left-right
continuum that now characterizes American political discourse and
policy.101 Thus, Professor Burt Neuborne's argument that "[t]he
Supreme Court should recognize that a compelling governmental
interest exists in fostering both the reality, and the perception, of the
capacity of elected representatives to make principled choices, driven
by a belief in the common good,"'" begs the question: To what
extent does race skew our definition of the common good, making
elusive a principal aim of reform-that of a more public-regarding
legislator-not only for voters of color, but for the poor and middle
class whites who, because of race and racism, refuse to form
governing coalitions with voters of color? If race is not a critical
element of reform efforts now, the morning after reform will look
much like the day before: the common good losing to narrower, elite
interests because people are unable to overcome racial
predispositions. In the words of the fictional Bulworth, "Rich people
have always stayed on top by dividing white people from colored
people."'03
Race remains the most significant social cleavage in the
formation of electoral and governing coalitions.'" Although there is
substantial dispute about whether racial cleavage has displaced class
cleavage, 05 it is clear that "when the race cleavage grows during a
particular election, the class cleavage experiences a corresponding
shrinkage during that election."'" Importantly, and consistent with
the discussion in Part I.B this inverse relationship can be triggered
even in the absence of explicit racial cues,'07 which suggests that race
is often present even if not readily discernible. Thus, to the extent
that reformers' conception of the common good means the
implementation of policies that benefit the lower and middle
classes, 08 race (meaning the division of lower-class whites from
facilitates the domination of poor people of all races).
101. See JOHNSON-CARTEE & COPELAND, supra note 69, at 54-55 (attributing the
emergence of voter political ideology along a liberal-conservative issue dimension to the
racial polarization of the 1960s civil rights era).
102. See Burt Neuborne, One Dollar-One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign
Finance Reform, 37 WAsHBURN L.J. 1, 46 (1997).
103. BULWORTH, supra note 1.
104. See MANZA & BROOKS, supra note 79, at 5, 168-70. Although the authors' study
is primarily concerned with social cleavages in the formation of electoral coalitions, such
cleavages ultimately affect policy preferences and agendas. Id at 1.
105. Id. at 168-75.
106. Id at 175.
107. d2
108. Proponents of reform suggest that the current system of private campaign finance
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blacks) may preclude the realization of this ideal as effectively as
money.
Reformers, then, are left with a hard choice. They can engage in
"consciousness-raising,''"" which would, in blunt terms, require
convincing poor and middle-class white voters of just how black (i.e.,
unequal) they really are. Or they can hide race, which, because of the
racial predispositions which inform voter policy preferences to the
detriment of their class interests, would have the paradoxical effect of
defeating one of the broad-based aims of reform, that of creating a
more public-regarding legislative process."0 For reformers, then, it is
either race now or later, but race it shall inevitably be.
II. THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCrIONS OF RACE
As explained in Part I, race and money are interrelated in
politics because (1) Equal Protection jurisprudence has failed to
protect the political aspirations of blacks qua blacks to the point of
reducing the efficacy of any money reforms; (2) money in politics is
used to subordinate voters of color through the use of racially coded
campaign propaganda; and (3) the racial divisions that ensue from
money's cuing role in electoral politics are also reflected in the policy
preferences of whites who might stand to benefit from campaign
finance, making it necessary for reformers to address race as a
precondition, or at least a concurrent condition, to class. Race is
integral to money in politics in yet another central way: Just as race is
a caste when employed in the non-transformative manner previously
discussed, it is also an agent of equality ascendancy in a different
context. "
The unequal inequality described in Part I is rooted in an
artificially cabined view of speech in relation to race, harbored by a
Court which may possess an unreasonably expansive view of speech
resounds primarily to the disadvantage of these groups.
109. See Mar J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and The False Consciousness Problem,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1778-79 (1990) (defining consciousness-raising as "a collective
practice of searching for self-knowledge through close examination of our own
circumstances, in conjunction with organized movements to end existing conditions of
domination").
110. For an analysis of the manner in which leaders of the current campaign finance
movement hide or ignore race, see infra Part III.A.
111. I use the term "transformative" here in the same sense in which I have discussed
transformative politics elsewhere: "Transformative politics are policies that are remedial
in nature, that transcend ordinary political discourse, and that offer the promise of
fundamental, positive change in the lives of those toward whom such policies are
directed." See Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, supra note 13, at 845-46.
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in relation to money. Citizens have different speech resources.1
Money is one such resource." For those who lack this resource,
however, other avenues of expression must be pursued. A
constitutional jurisprudence that in effect permits the unfettered
expenditure of one resource (money)," 4 while substantially limiting
the expenditure of others (in this instance, race)," 5 hardly allows the
people to "retain control over the quantity and range of debate on
public issues in a political campaign.""' 6 To the contrary, the
Supreme Court has privileged the expenditure of money over other
avenues of participation.
7
It is not difficult to conceive of race as a form of expression,
especially within the context of politics. As a doctrinal matter,
because the First Amendment protects political association as well as
speech,"18 black voters petitioning state legislatures for the creation of
majority-minority districts and joining together to elect their
preferred candidate is protected activity which meets at the nexus of
speech and association." 9 The oppression they share as black citizens
motivates this protected expression.20
112. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 71, at 1731-32 (discussing multiple modes of
political participation, and by extension, of political speech). My use of the term
"resource" in the context of political participation will evoke for some readers the
discussions among political scientists regarding group and individual resources which
explain levels of political participation among various socio-economic groups. See, e.g.,
TATE, supra note 98, at 75-108 (weighing the role of group consciousness, membership in
black political organizations, church membership, and black office seeking in explaining
levels of black political participation). I am not, however, interested in levels of
participation as such, but rather in the modes of available participation and the degree to
which the Supreme Court has facilitated or impeded access to these different modalities.
113. Issacharoff and Karlan, supra note 71, at 1731-32.
114. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38-59 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional the
Federal Election Campaign Act's expenditure limitations).
115. See infra notes 120-59 and accompanying text.
116. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57.
117. Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, supra note 13, at 857-60 (arguing that
the Court has failed to apply the same constitutional values and standards in its regulation
of race in politics as it has required in the regulation of money in politics).
118. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
119. See Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and The Endangered
Two-Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1, 37, 56 n.243 (1998) (discussing black voters' efforts
to create majority-minority districts as protected First Amendment activity uninhibited by
the Equal Protection Clause).
120. See id. at 25-26 (discussing racial schisms in policy preferences between blacks
and whites); id. at 55 (arguing that black political interests are founded on a common
history of oppression). See also Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent
for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2000) (explaining the formation of
group identity politics as resulting from a group's recognition of its exclusion and
observing that this recognition has political consequences because "[tihe point of
view(ing) shared by a specific group is formed by the group's outsiderness. .. ").
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In equating race with expression, I necessarily embrace a
broader view of race than that indicated by biology.'2' Racial
identification is much more than a physical state, if it is that at all; it is
an amalgam of the social and psychological effects of one's societal
position,'2 effects which in the case of voters of color have found
their expression in the body politic.'" This reality escapes the
Supreme Court in its reverse-racial-gerrymandering jurisprudence
when the Court admonishes that race may not be used as a proxy for
political characteristics. 24  Race itself may be but a set of proxies,
political and social, which, in the case of black voters, form the very
lexicon of their political discourse.'2 Thus, the significance of race, of
blackness, in a socio-political context is its expression, for "[i]dentites,
once formed, require expression in order to exist."'1 26 Blacks express
a divergent sense of history and justice when, in contrast to most
white Americans, they overwhelmingly support reparations to the
ancestors of American slaves. Blacks express their outsider voice
when their votes in presidential contests consistently diverge from the
majority of white Americans." They express the extremities of their
differences with the electorate at large when, unlike the majority of
Americans, fully three-quarters of blacks reject George W. Bush as
the legitimate President.29  Absent expressions such as these-
expression which Professor Nan Hunter (borrowing from Judith
Butler) has termed race's "performativity""130-race would be utterly
unimportant to our body politic. Once we recognize race as speech,
as a phenomenon that must be performed in order to have import, we
121. See K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMAN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE
POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 71-74 (1996) (refuting the notion of race as biology);
IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 30-31
(1996) (arguing that white identity is a social construct built on negative minority
identities); Hunter, supra note 120, at 5 (discussing conceptions of race as not "simply
inborn fortuities" but rather "as socialized meanings of communities and groups").
122. See APPIAH & GUTMAN, supra note 121, at 78; Hunter, supra note 120, at 6.
123. See APPIAH & GUTMAN, supra note 121, at 151-62; Hunter, supra note 120, at 12-
17 (discussing black voter cohesiveness and affirming race as an accurate political proxy).
124. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996) ("[T]o the extent that race is used as a
proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in
operation.").
125. See Hunter, supra note 120, at 12-18.
126. See id. at 9.
127. A 1997 poll found that two-thirds of blacks supported an apology for slavery and
reparations, while two-thirds of whites opposed an apology and 88% opposed reparations.
Oscar Avula, Money Would Absolve the Sins of Slavery, Advocate Says, KAN. CITY STAR,
June 18,1999, at A8.
128. See supra note 97.
129. Id.
130. See Hunter, supra note 120, at 9.
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must then ask whether it is so different from other expression as to
warrant curtailment or suppression.
The only conceivable justification for disadvantaging black
voters' expression in the political process, while allowing money its
virtually free reign, is that the Constitution, namely the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, insists on this type
of inequality. This is an extraordinary and implausible proposition.
To understand why, let us first better understand the disharmony
between the Supreme Court's treatment of money versus race. If I
am a wealthy individual (and correlatively a white individual), I can
contribute up to $2,000 per election cycle ($1,000 for the primary,
$1,000 for the general election) to the candidate of my choice. 3,' I
may contribute a total of $25,000 in a calendar year in "hard
money"'13 2 to candidates, political party committees, and political
action committees. 33 I may add to this an unlimited amount of "soft
money" 34 to a political party, which, though it may not funnel the
money directly to my preferred candidate, can engage in "party
building activities," which will benefit the candidate or candidates of
my choice.3 5 And, of course, I may expend unlimited sums of money
directly on the candidate of my choice (provided I do not coordinate
the expenditure with the candidate), 36 or I may declare my own
candidacy and self-finance my campaign to a limit defined only by the
depths of my wallet. 37 Moreover, the effect that my cash has on the
political process is not limited to the election itself. Save for the
highly unlikely instance of quid pro quo corruption, I can seek from
the legislative process special access and outcomes that I would not
131. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)(A) (1994). See also Association of The Bar, City of New
York, Commission on Campaign Finance Reform, DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY:
BLUEPRINT FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 17 (2000) [hereinafter DOLLARS AND
DEMOCRACY].
132. Hard money is raised within the contribution limits and other requirements of the
Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") and is the only type of funding that can be
used to directly benefit or specifically advocate the election or defeat of a federal
candidate. CORRADO, supra note 13, at 67-68.
133. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(3) (1994).
134. Soft money is money raised and spent outside the contribution and source
limitations of the FECA because the money is not used to advocate directly on behalf of
or against a particular federal candidate. CORRADO, supra note 13, at 68.
135. Id.; Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Synder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money,
Strong Partes, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 598, 598-601 (2000) (describing soft money as a
loophole in the FECA's contribution restrictions that allows evasion).
136. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77-81 (limiting the definitions of "contribution" and




have absent my wealth and generosity.18 All of these contributions
and expenditures can be made with a subordinating intent or effect-
that is, they can be used to mobilize majorities of voters against
outsider groups. 139 Opponents of campaign finance reform respond,
"that's just the way it is." Some people through no fault of their own
have more money than others, and their preference as to how to
expend it, even within the political arena, implicates no proscriptive
powers of the government.40 In sum, when it comes to money, the
Constitution, at least as interpreted by the Court and opponents of
reform, permits private resources a liberal (some would say virtually
unchecked) influence on the public sphere.
Now assume that I am a black (and correlatively poorer) voter. I
reside in the South, where racial bloc voting remains prevalent. 4'
Because Georgia has been the situs for much of the conflict over
reverse-racial gerrymandering, I will place myself there. There are
two facts of political life for me. First, even if I had lots of money,
getting elected to Congress would be more difficult because racial
bloc voting is a formidable barrier for black candidates. 43 In a
thorough analysis of this problem, political scientist Keith Reeves
conducted a "social experiment" to determine the extent to which
racial appeals in a biracial political contest influence white voters'
evaluative judgments of black candidates and their voting decision.
144
The social experiment involved manipulating a fictional mayoral
candidate's race using news articles issued to a probability sample of
138. See Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, supra note 13, at 865-66
(comparing legislative rewards to the wealthy for their campaign contributions to political
patronage outlawed under the First Amendment).
139. See supra Part I.B.
140. See Bradley Smith, supra note 13, at 64-66 (arguing that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments lack mandates to affirmatively promote equality of speech); id. at 79-80
(arguing that state action is absent from the current private system of contributions and
thus the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause cannot be invoked).
141. Richard R. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106
YALE L.J. 2505,2512 n.23 (1997).
142. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-17 (1995) (invalidating Georgia's
majority-black Eleventh congressional district because race predominated in its creation);
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 86-88 (1997) (upholding-on remand from Miller-the
district court's refusal on equal protection grounds to implement a congressional
districting plan that contained more than one black district).
143. See REEVES, supra note 78, at 93 ("[T]he contemporary tendency of whites to
discriminate against black political candidates on account of race shows how little
underlying attitudes have changed despite the significant gains made possible by the
Voting Rights Act.").
144. Id. at 24 (setting forth the goal of his study), 31 n.17 (defining the term "social
experiment" by distinguishing it from laboratory experimentation in the natural and social
sciences).
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voting-age white adults. 45 Each participant was given one article in
which the candidates disagree on either an environmental issue or
affirmative action. In each article, the description of the candidate
was the same, except the race of one candidate, Gregory Hammond,
was sometimes varied.a46 All other characteristics and positions being
equal, Reeves sought to measure the participants' receptivity to
Hammond in his black incarnation versus his white incarnation. Of
particular significance are Reeves's conclusions regarding the
preferences of the experimental group that was given the article
describing Hammond as black and as favoring affirmative action as a
remedy to "an identifiable history of discrimination by an
employer." '47 The discussion of affirmative action in connection with
the article's mention of Hammond as black served as a racial cue to
the reader. Reeves notes a startling response of participants when
asked for whom would they vote if the election were held today:
[W]hites were unwilling to say that they would cast a
ballot for either the white Christopher candidate or his
black challenger [Hammond] .... [T]he findings reveal a
striking tendency on the part of whites simply to "vacate
the field," that is, stampede toward the undecided
category, as evidenced by the 49 percent who declared
themselves "undecided." Observe that among those who
read the biracial contest story, the percentage of undecided
more than doubled."4
Reeves concludes that given the negative attitudes that many of
the "undecided" participants harbored about blacks, attitudes that
Reeves gleaned through surveys of this group, these individuals
would not likely support the black Hammond once inside the voting
booth.1 49 Reeves draws other conclusions that are relevant to an
African American, including one with ample funding, who is
considering a run for political office:
First, because our study participants were randomly
assigned to the experimental condition of reading one news
story, as compared to another, the resistance to supporting
the black Hammond candidate in the affirmative action story
experiment can be attributed to only a single causal
explanation: the subtle appeal of race. Second, because great
145. Id at 30-33.
146. Id. at 35.
147. Id. at 38.
148. Id. at 87.
149. Id. at 88.
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care was taken "to anticipate and defend against" the
weaknesses generally associated with experiments, the
results here "can be safely generalized to populations of real
interest."'150
The second fact of political life that I must face as a black
candidate running for Congress is that the possibility of my raising
sufficient money against an opponent in a bi-racial contest is
remote.' But I want to run for Congress because I believe, for
instance, that blacks receive insufficient representation from white
"blue dog" conservative Democrats 52 and because blacks have
heretofore been systematically denied equal participation in the
political processes of my state. 53 I, along with a group of other like-
minded black voters, lobby members of our black state legislative
caucus, who in turn put pressure on their white party cohorts, to
create a majority-minority district.154  We make all arguments,
including legal ones, and seek all appropriate aid, including oversight
150. Id. at 90 (emphasis removed). For a real-world reflection of Reeves's study, see
Kevin Sack, Pressed Against a 'Race Ceiling: Black Politicians Speak of Difficulties in
Seeking Higher Office, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 2001, at A12 (reporting the widespread
difficulties of black candidates in winning statewide offices). The article notes:
A number of black candidates, from former Mayor Andrew J. Young of
Atlanta to former Mayor Harvey Gantt of Charlotte, N.C., have lost statewide
races because of an inability to attract enough white votes. Others-like former
Mayor Richard Arrington of Birmingham, Ala., and Representative John Lewis
of Atlanta-have simply chosen not to compete because of their conviction that
they could never win the needed crossover vote.
Id.
151. See National Institute on Money in State Politics, Summary of Campaign Funding
Patterns, Georgia State Senate 1992, 1994, 1996, at www.followthemoney.org (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (summarizing the disparities in funding for black versus
white state senate candidates). For a more detailed discussion of these disparities, see
infra Part III.
152. One need only read the accounts of former Senator John Ashcroft's confirmation
as United States Attorney General for support of this belief. Senator Zell Miller of
Georgia, a Democrat, voted in support of Ashcroft, despite hailing from a state that is
nearly 30% black. See Karen Hosler, Ashcroft Confirmed Amid Fierce Criticism, BALT.
SUN, Feb. 2, 2001, at 1A. Miller cast this vote notwithstanding the severe criticism leveled
against Aschcroft's civil rights record by leading Senators and advocacy groups.
153. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 936-38 (1995) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
(recounting Georgia's history of discrimination against blacks in the exercise of the
franchise).
154. For a detailed account of how this process transpired in Georgia after the 1990
census and the Supreme Court's use of this process to invalidate the two majority-black
districts in Georgia that ensued from the 1990 redistricting, see Smith, A Black Party?
Timmons, Black Backlash and The Endangered Two-Party Paradigm, supra note 119, at
27-42 (analyzing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), and Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S.
74 (1997), in which the two districts to which the text hypothetical refers were struck
down).
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by the Justice Department, which is charged with enforcement of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.155 We are successful. 5 6 I get my district.
Indeed, two new majority-minority districts are created, bringing the
total in my state to three.1
57
Both new districts are held unconstitutional on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, however, because the Court concludes that
race predominated in their creation.158 What is the evidence of such
predominance of race? Ironically, the very petitioning of the state
legislature to create such a district is evidence of its
unconstitutionality. 5 9 But that is not the only private conduct that the
Court finds probative of unconstitutionality. In striking down the
districts, the Court makes a normative judgment about black political
behavior: "When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it
engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a
particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls.' "160 The short answer to the Court's concern is that blacks
either do or do not prefer candidates of their same race; if they do,
why is this expression not as protected as the expenditure of money
under the First Amendment? Why, in short, is the Supreme Court
soft on money but hard on race?
A. The Public/Private Distinction
Some might attempt to distinguish the Court's treatment of
money from its treatment of race based on differences in the public
nature of the conduct engaged in by the racial interests versus the
monied interests. The argument is that an individual's or group's
expenditure of money is a private act while the speech medium of
black voters seeking the creation of a majority-minority district
requires government action. Yet government action is as much a part
of the expenditure of campaign dollars as private action is a part of
the black voters' lobbying efforts. The congressional districts for
which the money is used do not exist in the state of nature. Their
creation requires state action. Legislatures can and do draw districts





159. Id. at 30-31.
160. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911-12 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
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get elected and other candidates will have to spend less. 61 They can
also draw districts where money on the whole is less of a factor, which
might be the case in majority-minority districts.162 It is erroneous,
then, to view the financing of a campaign as a private act when the
state has a significant role in defining money's raison d'etre in a
campaign as well as its ultimate impact.
Our system of campaign finance is public-oriented in another
respect. To the degree that donors give to receive, they must petition
the government for the salutary outcomes they seek. Why is it
acceptable for Carl Linder to use his money to encourage favorable
treatment of Chiquita bananas' 63 but constitutionally objectionable
for black voters to use their voice to encourage the Georgia
legislature to create a majority-black district? The fact that black
voters speak through the prism of race can only de-legitimize their
conduct if the Court limits its view of race to race as biology rather
than race as a reality that these voters have been forced to live.
Finally, even if one is inclined to believe that donating or
expending money in connection with a campaign is a private act,
Shaw v. Reno" and its progeny reveal that the Court is quite willing
to regulate private expression that influences the public sphere. For
instance, in Shaw, one alleged harm to the white plaintiffs in a newly
created majority-minority district was that the creation of such a
district "reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group... will prefer the same candidates at the polls."'65 If such a
161. In a marginal district, for instance, small shifts in voter preference can change
outcomes because neither party is particularly dominant. See Michael J. Clarman,
Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 541 (1997).
Competition and the need for the expenditure of large sums of money to retain control of
the district are thus greater in such a district. Conversely, when a legislature gerrymanders
a district so that one party dominates its composition, there is little to no competition in
the district and the same party, indeed the same representative, will likely win year in and
year out by large margins. Eric O'Keefe and Aaron Steelman, The End of Representation:
How Congress Stifles Electoral Competition, Cato Policy Analysis No. 279, 13, Aug. 20,
1997, at http:llcato.orglpubs/pas/pa-279.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). There is logically far less need for the expenditure of large sums of money to
retain control of such a safe seat.
162. See THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 15, at 148-49 (noting that the cost of
election in predominantly black congressional districts is often low).
163. RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 103
(2000) (arguing that the Clinton administration sought to accommodate Carl Linder, who
gave a large amount in campaign contributions, by seeking favorable European treatment
of Linder's Chiquita Brands bananas). Robinson observes that Clinton's actions on behalf
of Linder directly threatened the economies of four Caribbean democracies whose
bananas would be usurped by Chiquita's. IL
164. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
165. Id. at 647.
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preference existed, it would admittedly be private-as private as the
act of registering that preference in the voting booth, and moreover,
as private as giving a campaign contribution to a candidate for whom
one had a racial preference. The Court is undeterred in regulating
this private preference because "the Court is rejecting as harmful an
official acceptance that racial identity reliably translates into political
perspective.' 1 66 But if Buckley v. Valeo is correct that "[i]n the free
society ordained by our Constitution it is. . . the people-individually
as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and political
committees-who must retain control over the quantity and range of
debate on public issues in a political campaign,"167 then the Court
must respect concerted black action to create majority-minority
districts and, moreover, must respect the judgment of these voters
concerning who should represent their district. Yet Shaw illustrates
that for all the debate about whether or not campaign finance
involves state action sufficient to invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment 1 6 the Court is quite at ease with regulating private
speech and association when it views such regulation as necessary to
achieve its vision of the polity.
Although the Court has previously allowed regulation of speech
and association in the voting process, it has done so under very
different circumstances and with extraordinarily different results. 69
Thus, the Court's consideration of racial bloc voting as triggering
liability under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the concomitant
creation of a majority-minority district to remedy such a harm 70 is
effectively a curtailment of white voters' speech and association
rights.17' Likewise, courts' explicit consideration of the racialized
nature of the conduct of campaigns in determining liability under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act may have a chilling effect on
166. See Hunter, supra note 120, at 15.
167. 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
168. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
169. See Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, supra note 13, at 846-49.
170. See, e.g., Gingles v. Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
171. The First Amendment permits a citizen the right "to cast his vote ... for whatever
reason he pleases." See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964). The 1982
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act and Gingles, in interpreting those amendments,
balance other constitutional concerns against the First Amendment, and where racial bloc
voting is found-even though whites are free to engage in it with or without scienter-
courts may disaggregate the electoral scheme that facilitates such expression, effectively
curtailing it. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 84, at 438-40 (likening the school segregation in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to speech because of the white




speech. 72 The Court, however, has accepted these types of speech
constraints as a proper enforcement of Congress's authority under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to prohibit racial
discrimination in voting.'7 ' To allow misplaced First Amendment
concerns to trump Congress's authority would both reduce and
homogenize speech, investing a white majority with disproportionate
and largely unchecked control over the body politic. Thus, vote
dilution claims under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and their
erstwhile common remedy of majority-minority districts, complement
the First Amendment by preventing racially contrived barriers to
effective political participation and infusing the political process with
a broader, more representative spectrum of political viewpoints than
would otherwise be possible.
Shaw claims, however, undo these very same free speech and
association interests. The remedies in these cases dismantle majority-
minority districts, creating less, not more, speech and less, not more,
diversity of speech. White voters continue to resist black candidates,
making their election in a predominantly white district improbable,
absent unusual circumstances. 174 This reluctance diminishes the
quality and quantity of political debate that Buckley places at a
premium where money is concerned. Moreover, this reluctance
diminishes the quality and quantity of expression of black voters'
views and policy preferences at the very stage when such expressions
matter the most-in the legislative process. Shaw and its progeny,
then, are sharply at odds with the First Amendment.
B. Expressive Harms
Because Shaw plaintiffs cannot show that their votes have been
diluted-since invariably even after the creation of majority-minority
districts, white districts continue to constitute a disproportionate
share of districts-these plaintiffs cannot claim a comparable harm to
black plaintiffs who claim vote dilution. Lacking such a harm, the
Supreme Court, now aided by academic commentary, has posited a
different kind of harm that results from the creation of majority-
minority districts, at least when those districts eschew so-called
172. The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 specifically permits courts, in determining liability for vote dilution under
section 2 of the Act, to consider "[w]hether political campaigns have been characterized
by overt or subtle racial appeals." S. REP. No. 97-417, at 9 (1982).
173. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525-29 (1997) (reviewing a history of
voting rights cases).
174. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
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traditional districting principles such as compactness of shape.
Professors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi, for example, have
explained Shaw in this way:
One can only understand Shaw, we believe, in terms of a
view that what we call expressive harms are
constitutionally cognizable. An expressive harm is one that
results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a
governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or
material consequences the action brings about. On this
view, the meaning of a governmental action is just as
important as what that action does. Public policies can
violate the Constitution not only because they bring about
concrete costs, but because the very meaning they convey
demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public
values. On this unusual conception of constitutional harm,
when a governmental action expresses disrespect for such
values, it can violate the Constitution.17 5
In First Amendment terms-which are the relevant terms for
comparing the speech resources of voters of color to wealthier
individuals-neither Pildes nor the Court explains why, in the
absence of vote dilution, the Equal Protection Clause should be more
concerned with the message the government conveys than the speech
that it effectively suppresses by dismantling black districts.
17 6
C. Original Intent
Finally, an original intent argument is perhaps the least
persuasive justification for the Court's coddled protection of
monetary speech versus racial expression. Substantial evidence
indicates that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
intend to prevent remedial race-based measures. 7  By contrast, the
175. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, 'Bizarre Districts,' and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483,506-07 (1993) (emphasis removed).
176. Indeed, because the creation of the majority-black districts in Shaw, however
untraditional their shapes, cannot rationally be understood to convey a disregard for the
interests of white voters, it is fair to question why it falls within the province of the Equal
Protection Clause at all. See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1, 17-18 & n.59 (2000) (arguing that while expressive harms
should be cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause, such harms exist only when their
meanings convey that the government has not shown equal concern for all citizens).
177. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 150 ("[T]he history of the Fourteenth
Amendment strongly suggests that the framers did not intend to prevent affirmative
action."); Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Color Blindness, 96
MICH. L. REv. 245, 326-27 (1997). Saunders, who specifically analyzes the Supreme
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framers of the First Amendment did not likely contemplate the
modem-day phenomenon of large political expenditures.178 Yet the
Court's reverse-racial gerrymandering cases for their fidelity to original understanding,
writes:
Those who framed and ratified the Equal Protection Clause certainly
intended it to prevent the states from using racial generalizations as a basis for
singling out anyone for special disadvantage, except perhaps in very compelling
circumstances. But the suggestion that the clause was also intended to render
presumptively unconstitutional all race-based state action, whether or not it has
such a discriminatory effect, would have absolutely astounded them. The Thirty-
ninth Congress specifically rejected a number of proposals that would have done
this. Even its most radical members understood that the Equal Protection
Clause it finally passed did no such thing.
Id.
178. See ALEXANDER, supra note 70, at 12-13; Edward B. Foley, Philosophy, the
Constitution, and Campaign Finance Reform, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 (1998)
("[I]t is highly unlikely that the ratifiers of the First Amendment had any specific
intentions at all on the topic of campaign finance. .. ."); Frederick Schauer, Judicial
Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1326, 1331 (1994) (noting that
the question of whether money is speech was not readily resolved by reference to original
intent or constitutional history). Any original intent analysis of the First Amendment and
campaign finance must account for or consider the Seventeenth Amendment, which, while
not facially concerned with political speech, was enacted in part to curb the influence of
money in the selection of United States Senators. See Terry Smith, Rediscovering the
Sovereignty of the People: The Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1, 65-66 (1996).
Yet the law review literature on campaign finance reform makes little to no reference to
the Seventeenth Amendment. The debates surrounding passage of the Amendment,
however, suggest that such inattention is misguided. Those debates are replete with
references to the corrupting influence of money in the legislative appointment of Senators,
a process which predated the popular election of Senators mandated by the Seventeenth
Amendment. See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 2409 (1911) (statement of Rep. Young) (arguing
for preserving the Time, Place and Manner Clause of Article I in order to maintain
Congress's ability to prevent "selfish moneyed interest[s]" from controlling the legislative
process in the Senate); 47 CONG. REc. 231 (1911) (statement of Rep. Norris) (arguing that
direct election of Senators was necessary because "money has taken too important a part
in the control of the [state] legislature when it comes to the election of a United States
Senator, until it had almost become common knowledge among our people that no poor
man need apply"); 47 CONG. REC. 1764 (1911) (statement of Sen. Works) (stating that his
sole reason for supporting direct election of Senators was because special interests had
corrupted the state legislatures in the process of appointing Senators "and that the only
remedy for this evil that is threatening the integrity of our free institutions is to vest the
power in the people to be exercised directly at the polls.").
Notwithstanding the enactors' clear intention to reduce the role of money in
Senators' selection by reposing authority directly in the people, one Seventeenth
Amendment historian has declared the amendment a victim of unintended consequences
because:
the historical trend toward greater popularization of Senate elections, by
transferring direct responsibility from the legislators to the electorate en masse,
had given rise to the very conditions which reformers hoped to end with even
more popularization. Inevitably, big spending, the pressure of organized
interests, and backstage maneuvering would continue to characterize the
campaigns of senators long after the nostrum of direct elections had been
administered.
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Court has transformed a relatively well-established fact under the
Fourteenth Amendment into a blank slate, while treating the
inconclusive First Amendment as if its legislative history were that of
the Fourteenth. The result is that money is privileged, while race is
disadvantaged.
At the very least, the ease with which the Court has re-fashioned
the Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding its history and the
decisions interpreting it prior to Shaw suggests that the absolutism of
prohibitions on expenditure caps is more an exaggerated policy
argument than an indelible feature of the First Amendment.
Alternatively-and maybe even in addition-perhaps the Supreme
Court has simply overregulated race in the political process. In either
case, its differential treatment has removed from voters of color the
C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 106 (1995).
Hoebeke's pessimism, however, appears to confuse the effects of the original
intent of the Seventeenth Amendment with the effects of the Supreme Court's decidedly
ahistorical analysis of free speech in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). (Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Buckley makes only passing reference to the Seventeenth
Amendment-in Justice White's partial dissent. See id. at 269 n.4 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).) The Amendment's supporters heard much the same
arguments that Hoebeke makes regarding the possibility that upon passage of the
Amendment, money may come to play a larger, rather than a decreased, role in the
selection of Senators. See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 1881 (statement of Sen. McCumber)
(arguing that popular elections would increase the need for large expenditures of money
by and on behalf of Senate candidates). Yet, up until the Amendment's ratification,
supporters steadfastly maintained that "instead of having the Senate filled up with the
representatives of predatory wealth who use their power to oppose the things that the
people love," the Senate would now be composed of far more public-regarding
individuals. See GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS 1042 (1906)
(quoting Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan). Hoebeke cannot be correct in his
conclusion that the Amendment created unintended consequences unless its supporters-
who were well aware of arguments like Hoebeke's-were either hopelessly naive or
simply intended that their statements regarding the reduction of money's influence be
merely precatory.
A more plausible translation of the Seventeenth Amendment's language and
history, however, supports the view that in reposing the power to elect Senators directly in
the people, Congress also intended that the people have residual authority to effectuate
one of the principal purposes of the Amendment, the reduction of the influence of money
in selecting Senators. This interpretation would argue against Buckley's invalidation of
expenditure limitations, see 424 U.S. at 58, limitations which may reasonably be viewed as
legislation incident to the execution of the Seventeenth Amendment. Indeed, the very
Congress which passed the Seventeenth Amendment in 1911 that same year imposed
restrictions on amounts that congressional and senatorial candidates could expend on
behalf in their own elections. See Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33,37 Stat. 25 (1911) (repealed
1925); SORAUF, supra note 14, at 5.
In sum, defending Buckley on original intent grounds requires reconciling the
62nd Congress's determination to reduce the role of money in the selection of Senators
with Buckley's effective handicapping of Congress's ability to achieve this goal.
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ameliorative expressive aspects of race, while allowing money
(through cuing and racial division) to further compound a pre-
existing inequality wrought by the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence.
III. POLITICS ON THE GROUND: A RACIAL CRITIQUE OF THE
MOVEMENT'S ACrORS AND LEGISLATIVE Focus
Race creates an unequal inequality because of the disparate
application of the Equal Protection Clause to voters of color.
179 Race
imbues money's influence in politics with a subordinating caste
through the use of color-coded political messages.
80 Race creates a
barrier to recognition of common class-based interests, potentially
minimizing the efficacy of any money reforms.1
81 If race, however, is
so central to money's role in politics, why is this relationship not
evident when one looks at politics on the ground-the political actors
and non-academics who propel the campaign finance reform
movement? I suggest in this section that the answer is partially the
neglect and racial conservatism of some of the movement's actors,
but, less self-evidently, the answer also lies in the failure of reformers
to recognize that just as money has been employed to perpetuate the
malignant uses of race within the political process, reform might
create an equal opportunity for promoting a transformative racial
ideology. In the final portion of this section, I set forth some "first
principles" that should guide a campaign finance movement so that it
might include the interests of people of color.
A. The Actors: Left, Right, and Nowhere
At first blush, it is somewhat bewildering that the fairly
conservative Senator from Arizona, John McCain, has teamed with
the relatively liberal Senator from Wisconsin, Russell Feingold, who
together have become the political poster children for campaign
finance reform. But look again. Campaign finance reform is easily
mistaken as a "white" issue advanced by middle-class suburbanites
and good-government reformers.1n McCain and Feingold, each
roughly filling the modes of these two categories, help explain why.
McCain's racial conservatism-his using the Confederate Flag to gain
179. See supra Part I.A.
180. See supra Part I.B.
181. See supra Part I.C.
182. Spencer Overton, Money and Race: Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, 
at
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the support of Southern primary voters during his presidential bid, his
opposing a Martin Luther King federal holiday1 3-does not figure
into his alliance with Feingold, who is not without questions regarding
his own racial politics," because neither man appears to appreciate
the racial dimension of the movement they purport to lead. Under
their odd-couple imagery, if campaign finance reform is not an issue
of the Left or the Right, it isn't an issue of black or white either.
Race is ignored to an even more insidious effect by other
prominent reformers. Ralph Nader campaigned extensively on a
platform of campaign finance reform during the 2000 presidential
election."s Nader said a great deal more during the course of his
campaign about this topic than he did about race, and perhaps his
relative inattention to race foreshadowed the impact of his reformist
campaign: Despite the overwhelming preference of black voters for
Gore, Nader threw the election to Bush. 86 With actors like Nader on
the Left, it is little wonder why campaign finance reform is
susceptible to being viewed as a "white" issue.
If Nader's disregard of black voters' wishes in pursuit of
campaign finance reform helps to paint the issue as "white,"
opponents of reform fuel this perception even more. Take, for
instance, Senator Mitch McConnell, a Kentucky Republican who has
opposed reform on First Amendment grounds." 7 One would expect
that such an ardent defender of free speech through the expenditure
of money would be equally fervent in guarding other forms of
political participation. McConnell, however, not only voted against
the National Voter Registration Act (popularly known as the Motor-
183. See Smith, Parties and Transformative Politics, supra note 13, at 856 & n.45.
184. For instance, Ed Garvey, the 1998 Wisconsin Democratic gubernatorial candidate,has criticized as racially insensitive Feingold's vote in favor of John Ashcroft, President
George W. Bush's arch-conservative Attorney General appointee, whose record on civilrights includes opposing desegregation in Missouri. See Editorial, Feingold, McCallum
Are Reasons Some Don't Vote, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Feb. 6,2001, at 9A.
185. See Cody Ellerd, Politics-US: Nader Takes Anti-Corporate Message On The Road,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 16, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTER PRESS SERVICE
File (noting that Nader's platform consisted of three primary issues: campaign finance,
trade, and health care).
186. See Nader Could Lose Allies for Spoiler Role; Candidate Still Unfazed by Critics,
THE FLA. TIMES-UNION, Dec. 31, 2000, at A-13 ("Nader only took two percent in
Florida-a state that was never considered a Nader stronghold-but that was enough to
throw the state to Bush."); Seesaw Battle for Bush, Gore, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 8,2000, atAl (noting that Gore's performance in Florida was due to "the state's women and an
astounding turnout of black voters").
187. See Robin Toner, After a Marathon Debate, a Moment for Emotions, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2001, at A17 (noting that McConnell, a chief opponent of McCain-Feingold, had
based his opposition on "simple free speech").
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Voter Bill), but he also proposed an amendment to that statute which
would have denied participants in the Women, Infants and Children
(WIC) program the right to register to vote at state or local WIC
offices."8 In floor debate, McConnell insisted that his amendment
was "not about the merits of the motor-voter bill," which required
states to designate the offices of various public-assistance programs as
voter registration sites.89 Yet it was estimated that the effect of
McConnell's amendment would have been to exclude 500,000 poor
women from the benefit of the motor-voter law.19 It appears, then,
that it is not free speech that McConnell is seeking to protect in
opposing campaign finance reform, but rather the free speech and
participation of wealthy (and by extension, disproportionately white)
citizens.' 91
The principal political actors in the campaign finance debate,
those on both the Left and the Right, do not inspire confidence in
minority communities that they are capable of being sensitive to
minority concerns in formulating campaign finance reform proposals.
The question remains whether the substance of their proposals
corroborates the unfortunate impression left by the reform debates.
B. McCain-Feingold, Voters of Color, and Money Without Ideology
In this section I analyze a major piece of proposed campaign
finance legislation, the McCain-Feingold bill, to illustrate how the
thrust of current reform proposals ignores or does not adequately
address issues of vital importance to minority voters and candidates.
More specifically, McCain-Feingold, as recently passed by the United
States Senate, does not assist in creating a level playing field for
candidates of color and does not otherwise enhance the substantive
incentives for people of color to participate in the political process-
two essential elements in the formation of a transformative racial
ideology to counteract the racial malignancy that has been purchased
with political money.
188. See 140 CONG. REC. 22102 (1994) (Amendment No. 2559).
189. See id. at 22103 (Statement of Sen. McConnell).
190. See id. at 22107 (Statement of Sen. Leahy).
191. If McConnell is selective in his protection of free speech, his principal nemesis,
Senator John McCain, is no less discriminatory in his advocacy of democratic reforms that
extend beyond money. Even in the wake of the Florida presidential debacle, McCain has
opposed including electoral reform as part of campaign finance reform, implausibly
claiming that Congress lacked "a clear understanding of the depth and significance of the
problem." Hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee,
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 7, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE File.
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1. The Hard Money Increase
While much attention has been focused on the McCain-Feingold
"Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001,"'192 the heart of that
legislation does not address the difficulties faced by minorities in the
current system and may well increase barriers to their full
participation. The gravamen of McCain-Feingold is a ban on the
receipt of "soft money" contributions by national committees of
political parties, federal officeholders, and candidates for federal
offices. 93 Soft money contributions, now infamous, are contributions
that do not have to comply with the Federal Election Campaign Act's
(FECA's) dollar limitations and source prohibitions because such
contributions are not used to directly advocate the election or defeat
of a federal candidate."4 Thus, while the FECA limits individual
contributions to candidates to $1,000.00 "with respect to any election
for Federal office" and caps the aggregate contributions of an
individual at $25,000.00,195 these limitations do not apply to soft
money. 9 6 Likewise, while it is unlawful for a corporation or labor
union to use its treasury funds to make a contribution or expenditure
"in connection with" a federal election,197 no such restriction applies
to soft money contributions by corporations or unions. 8
192. See S. 27, 107th Cong., as amended on the floor of the Senate, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (Jan. 22,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
193. With respect to a national committee, the proposed legislation prohibits such
committee to "solicit, receive or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or
transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds" not subject to limitations
contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a and 441b
(1997). With respect to a federal officeholder or a candidate for federal office, the
proposed act forbids such person to "solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in
connection with an election for Federal office" outside the limitations set forth in the
FECA. To further seal the soft money loophole, the bill requires that the expenditures
and disbursements made by a state, district, or local committee of a political party must be
made subject to the limitations established under the FECA.
194. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 131, at 11, 44; CORRADO, supra note 13,
at 68.
195. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1), (3) (1994).
196. CORRADO, supra note 13, at 68.
197. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994).
198. CORRADO, supra note 13, at 68; see also Stephen Ansolabehere & James M.
Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 598, 601 (2000)
(noting that the soft money loophole enables corporations to avoid having to create a
separate segregated fund to raise money for federal elections); Daniel M. Yamish, Note,
The Constitutional Basis for A Ban on Soft Money, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1268
(1998) ("Under the soft money system, corporations and unions, otherwise barred from




In theory, soft money is used for purposes other than the support
of federal candidates, principally "party building activities," the
support of non-federal political activities, and generic party
advertising. 99 With the explosion of party issue advertisements,
however, this distinction is now widely recognized as a hollow
fiction.2°° Because party issue ads do not expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a candidate, they fall outside of the FECA's
purview and may be financed in part by soft money.21 McCain-
Feingold seeks to put an end to this practice by banning the raising
and receipt of soft money by political parties. 2°
For present purposes, I am not at all interested in the
constitutionality of McCain-Feingold's soft money ban or other
aspects of the bill. Numerous commentaries have been and will
continue to be written on that subject. 2°  Instead, I wish to use
199. Anthony Corrado, Giving, Spending, and 'Soft Money,' 6 J.L. & POL'Y 45, 47-50
(1997).
200. Id. at 50-55; DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 131, at 11, 44.
201. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 131, at 57.
202. Two kinds of issue advocacy are financed by soft dollars: party issue ads and issue
ads run by nominally unaffiliated interest groups. See CORRADO, supra note 13, at 88.
McCain-Feingold addresses issue ads financed in whole or in part by soft money
differently depending on whether the source of the ad is a political party or an interest
group. With respect to political parties, because the bill starves such entities of soft
money, it effectively eliminates their ability to run soft money funded issue ads. With
respect to interest groups, the measure is less draconian but still prohibitive.
Corporations, labor unions, and certain federally tax exempt organizations are prohibited
from using general treasury funds to engage in "electioneering communication." See S. 27,
§ 203. An "electioneering communication" is in turn defined as any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified federal candidate, that is made
within a prescribed time period within the holding of an election, and the audience for
which includes voters eligible to vote in that election. Id § 201. Although section 203
initially exempts various not-for-profit groups from its reach, where such groups engage in
"targeted electioneering communications," defined as a communication "distributed from
a television or radio broadcast station or provider of cable or satellite television service
whose audience consists primarily of residents of the State for which the clearly identified
candidate is seeking office," that exemption is lost. See id. § 204. Finally, the bill attacks
issue advertising by interest groups, treating "coordinated expenditures or other
disbursement" made by any person "in connection with a candidate's election" as a
contribution to the candidate. See id. § 214. The aim of this provision is facilitated by a
rather capacious definition of "coordinated expenditure or other disbursement," which is
defined as "a payment made in concert or cooperation with, at the request or suggestion
of, or pursuant to any general or particular understanding with, such candidate, the
candidate's authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee
or its agents." Id.; see also Alison Mitchell, Campaign Finance Bill Passes in Senate 59-41;
House Vows a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at Al (detailing the major provisions of
McCain-Feingold).
203. See generally Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional
Prohibition On A Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179 (1998) (arguing that a blanket ban on
soft money would be unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Bradley A. Smith,
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McCain-Feingold as a representative piece of reform legislation and
to assess its responsiveness to the concerns of minority voters and
candidates. On this score, the bill is largely unresponsive. While soft
money may occupy the nation's and reformers' attention, the
empirical studies suggest that it is the inability to compete effectively
for hard dollars-sums regulated by the FECA in the form of dollar
limits and source restrictions-that poses the most substantial barrier
for minority candidates °' In their study of the patterns of
contributions to black congressional candidates during the 1980s,
John Theilmann and Al Wilhite make several important findings
regarding the flow of hard money 0 5 First, with respect to black
candidates' financing from all hard money sources-political action
committees, party contributions and coordinated spending, and
contributions from individuals-Theilmann and Wilhite demonstrate
"a pattern of racial discrimination in the allocation of total campaign
contributions."' 6 The authors' study controlled for variables such as
candidate strength, opposition strength, party affiliation, and
incumbency. 7  They concluded that "[b]ecause the primary
determinants of candidates' fund-raising abilities are included in the
analysis, the [funding] differential appears to be racially
motivated."2 0
In their more particularized examination of individual
contributions to black candidates, Theilmann and Wilhite, after
controlling for electability and demographic characteristics, conclude
that "[i]ndividual contributors apparently discriminate against black
candidates. '"2 9 Thus, "[i]ncumbent black representatives received
significantly lower large contributions from individual donors than
did white incumbents in three of five election cycles studied." 10 The
same was true of non-incumbent blacks in two of five election
cycles' Moreover, because blacks were more dependent on smaller
contributions, they incurred greater direct fund-raising costs because
The Sirens' Song: Campaign Finance Regulation And The First Amendment, 6 J.L. &
POL'Y 1 (1997) (arguing that freedom of speech and political participation should override
desires of campaign finance reformers).
204. See infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
205. See TBI-LMANN & WILHrrE, supra note 15.
206. Id. at 78.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 148.
210. Id. at 145.
211. Id.
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raising money in small amounts from several people is more time
consuming than obtaining larger amounts from fewer donors212
A later study focusing on black candidates for the Georgia state
senate tends to corroborate Theilmann and Wilhite's findings.
2 13
Examining three election cycles through the mid-1990s, the study
found that white candidates had funding advantages over black
candidates of 73%, 16%, and 106% for each of the election cycles.
2 14
It concluded that "[a] comparison of campaign funds by race shows a
growing advantage of white candidates over African-American
candidates. 215
McCain-Feingold's soft money ban does not address this nagging
problem. To the contrary, because the version of the bill which
passed the Senate actually raises the individual contribution limit per
candidate from $1,000.00 per election to $2,000.00 per election, and
raised the aggregate annual individual contribution amount to
$37,000.00,216 McCain-Feingold exacerbates hard money funding
inequities between black and white candidates. 20 17 This provision
ignores the empirical evidence suggesting that black candidates
cannot effectively compete in the race for hard money individual
212. Id. at 146. The authors acknowledge that the disadvantage of lower levels of
individual contributions is somewhat offset in predominantly black districts because the
cost of campaigning tends to be lower. Id. at 148-49. Their study, however, predates
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657-58 (1993), which removes in many instances the
possibility of creating a majority-minority district. After Shaw, reforms that address the
hard money funding inequities between white and minority candidates are especially
needed.
213. See National Institute on Money in State Politics, Summary of Campaign Funding
Patterns, Georgia State Senate 1992, 1994, 1996, at www.followthemoney.org (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id. at 5.
216. See S. 27, § 308(a)-(b). These amounts are indexed for inflation. Id. The increase
in the individual contribution limits has enjoyed support among some reform advocates
who appear not to have taken account of the impact of such an increase on minorities.
See, e.g., DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 131, at 120-21 (proposing an increase
in the individual contribution limit with indexing for inflation in the future).
217. See Dexter Wimpish, Bad to Worse for Minorities with McCain-Feingold, at
http:l/www.tompaine.com/opinion2001/02/011 (Feb. 2, 2001) (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("[T]he increase in hard money contributions
would have a chilling effect on minority groups who struggle to have their voices heard
above the rush of currency into the coffers of our elected officials."). The increase in the
individual contribution allowance will also likely increase the disparity in the rates and
amounts of political contributions made by whites versus minorities. See Spencer A.
Overton, Fannie Lou Hamer Wouldn't Like This, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at A13. A
provision of McCain-Feingold that allows a candidate for the Senate to exceed the
$2,000.00 contribution limit in response to a wealthy opponent financing his race from
personal funds, see S. 27, § 304, would further compound these racial disparities.
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contributions, contributions which, despite the focus on soft money,
continue to constitute the majority of money raised by congressional
candidates.218
McCain-Feingold treats money as raceless, and thus non-
ideological, ignoring its disparate impact on candidates and voters of
color. But money can be no less ideological than the representation it
is used to secure. Race matters in determining the quality of
representation for voters of color.219 Campaign finance reform that
fails to take account of this political reality by not reforming-indeed
increasing-hard money inequities is not reform at all for people of
color. The imperative for inclusionary reform is all the greater in
light of Shaw v. Reno. Although running in a majority-minority
district tends to be less expensive for a minority candidate,' Shaw
makes such districts more difficult to create and thus makes minority
candidates more dependent on the very resource-hard money-
which eludes them.
2. The Party Soft Money Ban
The effects of the soft money ban on minority voters and
candidates are more speculative. On the one hand, the experience of
the 1980s, including party contributions to minority candidates and
coordinated spending on behalf of these candidates, suggested that at
least the Democratic Party was willing to use party-controlled money
to fund black challengers and broaden black representation in
Congress. 1  Direct assistance to candidates in the form of
contributions or coordinated expenditures, however, does not
constitute a major portion of the national party committee's
218. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 131, at 61 (noting that in 1996,
contributions from individuals constituted 53% of the funds received by all candidates for
the House of Representatives, 65% received by Senate incumbents, 60% received by
Senate challengers, and 52% received by Senate candidates for open seats).
219. KENNY J. WHITBY, THE COLOR OF REPRESENTATION: CONGRESSIONAL
BEHAVIOR AND BLACK INTERESTS 91-112 (1997) (demonstrating that the voting
behavior of black Representatives in Congress is, on the whole, more responsive to black
interests than white representatives). The group of white Representatives who vote
nearest ideologically to black Representatives are non-southern Democrats. Id. at 111.
However, "[w]hile both are in the high final passage/high amendment category, on
balance there is a good deal of space between the two groups on some important issues."
Id. Thus, even the most liberal of white Representatives are not as responsive to black
interests as are black Representatives.
220. THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 15, at 148-49.
221. Id. at 126 (noting that the Democratic party gave substantially greater




expenditures. l By contrast, soft money receipts and expenditures
have become part of the basic grist of the activities of national party
committees, accounting for a third of all income of national partiesPm
Although soft money contributions cannot be used to directly benefit
a federal candidate by, for instance, urging his election, parties do use
this money to run ads that indirectly support a particular candidate 4
In theory, then, party-controlled soft-money is one means of
providing a type of campaign finance affirmative action to black
candidatesPm Yet, based upon individual campaigns' overwhelming
allocation of resources to swing voters, 26 there is substantial reason to
doubt that the major parties are using soft money to remedy racial
inequities in the fund-raising and electoral processes. 2 7
Quite apart from the development and election of black
candidates, there is likewise scant evidence that soft money is used to
promote minority issues, thus creating a greater substantive basis for
minority voter participation in the electoral process. Concededly,
Democrats have directed some soft money at minority voters in order
to mobilize them to vote.tm One should not, however, confuse get-
out-the-vote efforts with the kind of courtship afforded white
independent voters. The soft money ads that the Democratic Party
ran on behalf of Al Gore largely tracked the issues of the Gore
campaign itself: prescription drugs, education, and the
222. See CORRADO, supra note 13, at 74-76.
223. See DOLLARS & DEMOCRACY, supra note 131, at 48. Underscoring soft money's
growing centrality, the 2000 Presidential election was the first in history where the
national party committees spent more on television ads than the presidential candidates
themselves spent on television ads; the majority of the party spending was financed by soft
money. See 2000 Presidential Race First In Modern History Where Political Parties Spend
More On TV Ads Than Candidates, Dec. 11, 2000, at http://www.brennancenter.org/
presscenter/pressrelease_2000_l211cmag.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
224. See WEST, supra note 75, at 12.
225. Indeed, because Democrats as a whole do not raise small contributions for
individual candidates as successfully as do Republicans, see Lizette Alvarez, Race is
Underway for Campaign Cash Before New Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at Al, the
soft money ban may harm the party generally, with disproportionate harm accruing to its
disproportionately minority rank and file.
226. See FRYMER, supra note 85, at 125.
227. See, e.g., Robert Moore, Shortchanged Black Democrat's Campaign Suffers As
Officials Back White Independent, Sept. 15, 2000, at http:llwww.njournalg.comlnewsl2000/
09/shortchanged_black_demos.html (Sept. 15, 2000) (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (providing anecdotal details of the Democratic Party's
lack of financial support for a black challenger in Virginia's Fifth Congressional District).
228. See CORRADO, supra note 13, at 79 (noting that in 1996 the Democratic Party
spent $5 million on generic party advertisements tailored to minority communities and
contributed some monies to groups to help turn out the minority vote).
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environment.19 Gore's incessant pursuit of white swing voters to the
exclusion of black concerns, such as drug sentencing disparities and
the racially disparate impact of the death penalty, did not go
unnoticed by black voters3 Soft money without a racially
transformative ideology is of ephemeral benefit to these voters. 31 It
renders them mere supplicants in the political process rather than
equals to glorified white independents.
Some skeptics of reform have argued that eliminating party soft
money will have a "hydraulic" effect, pushing these funds out of the
mediating hands of political parties and into the sole control of
largely single-issue groups engaging in unlimited independent
expenditures. 2  Perhaps this is so. In such a world, perhaps single-
issue groups will prove even less scrupulous in their use of racially-
coded campaign messages and will prove even more neglectful of
black interests than the parties themselves. The question begs,
however, should campaign finance reform really be this kind of
Hobson's choice for voters and candidates of color? Reform for them
must be better than a choice between the organized neglect of
political parties and the cacophonous neglect and racial malignancy of
single-issue interests groups. Reform must be an affirmation of their
equality.
229. See Battle of 'Soft Money' Spending On TV Ads Rages On Between Bush and
Gore, Oct. 16, 2000, http://www.brennancenter.orglpresscenterl
pressrelease_2000_101600.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
230. Terry M. Neal, Some Black Voters View Gore as the Lesser of Two Evils;
Concerns Go Unaddressed, They Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2000, at A24 (reporting that
many of the blacks interviewed "said they got the impression that Democrats were
focused on courting white, suburban women-and to a lesser extent, Latinos-almost to
the exclusion of blacks").
231. It is ephemeral because after the money has been spent to get out the black vote,
even if the preferred candidate of blacks prevails, policies of special importance to blacks
are not given precedence. Nothing better illustrates the point than President Bill Clinton's
tenure in office. At times referred to as the "the first black president," Clinton ironically
laid bare the fallacy of that moniker when in his final days in office he made sweeping civil
rights recommendations, including outlawing racial profiling and eliminating the disparity
in sentencing between crack and powder cocaine offenses. See Steven A. Holmes, In His
Final Week, Clinton Issues Proposals on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2001, at All. Civil
rights activists rightly noted that Clinton had had eight years to press these issues but had
failed to do so. See id.
232. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 71, at 1713-14; see also Alison Mitchell,
Before Debate, Added Scrutiny of Finance Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at Al
(reporting that opponents of McCain-Feingold believe that the soft money that parties are




3. Coordination, Base Voter Mobilization, and Fear of Reform
Professor Issacharoff's response to this Article uses one
provision of the McCain-Feingold bill that concerns coordination
between non-profit groups such as churches and candidates and
political parties (section 214) to broadly question the ameliorative
impact of campaign finance reform on black political participation
3
Section 214 treats coordinated expenditures or other disbursements
by nonprofits and other entities as a contribution to the candidate.2
Its potential overbreadth lies in its definition of "coordinated
expenditure or other disbursement," which it defines as "a payment
made in concert or cooperation with, at the request or suggestion of,
or pursuant to any general or particular understanding with a
candidate, his agents, or a political party committee."''25 Professor
Issacharoff contends that this definition may prohibit black churches
and advocacy groups like the NAACP from encouraging African
Americans to vote by, inter alia, conducting voter registration
drives.236 As my foregoing analysis makes clear, I oppose certain
provisions of McCain-Feingold and strongly question the efficacy of
others. Even if, however, specific skepticism about McCain-
Feingold's redefinition of coordination is warranted-and it appears
to be-unlike Professor Issacharoff, I am unwilling to allow the tail to
wag the dog. Section 214 does not render reform any less imperative
or possible.
Professor Issacharoff's analysis of McCain-Feingold's impact
on the mobilization of the minority vote is a testament to the
subservient role that minorities have been forced to play in the
current political process. Professor Issacharoff proclaims that "Al
Gore did not need to convince blacks to vote for him; he simply
needed to convince them to vote."''2 7 The less expensive "knock-and-
drag" campaigns, rather than large-scale media blitzes, are an
effective way to achieve this end, so if the sums of dollars directed at
minorities are relatively small, it is simply because there are cheaper
ways to reach them. Y 8  First, Professor Issacharoff's working
assumption that black voters need only be mobilized to vote, rather
233. Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Campaign Finance Reform, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1523,
1529-31 (2001).
234. See S. 27, 107th Cong., § 214, as amended on the floor of the Senate, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (Jan. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
235. Id § 214(b).
236. Issacharoff, supra note 233, at 1529.
237. IL at 1528-29.
238. Id. at 1529.
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than persuaded how to vote, is one that prominent campaign
professionals of color reject. According to Donna Brazile, the
manager of Al Gore's 2000 presidential campaign, a key error that
the Democratic Party has made in the past and continues to make is
to treat base voters such as minorities as "mobilization" voters only,
and not as "persuasion" voters. 9  According to Brazile, this
mentality often leads Democratic officials to give short shrift to the
support of grassroots efforts directed at minority voters, providing
too little money too late in the campaign.24 This observation was
echoed by Andy Hernandez, the Democratic National Committee's
Director of Base Vote from 1995 to 1997.241 According to Hernandez,
Democratic officials do not view voters of color as people who
determine election outcomes; instead, they view them as people who
must be placated as "constituents." 242  It is not that Professor
Issacharoff is wrong to focus on the importance of money in
mobilizing the minority vote; the problem is that he appears to be
offering the potential curtailment of these erratic and underfunded
efforts as a reason for minorities to embrace the status quo in
campaign finance.
In his apparent opposition to some reforms, Professor
Issacharoff treats money in largely the same fashion as equality
proponents of reform-without a racially transformative ideology.
Thus, Professor Issacharoff seems to think it is reasonable that black
issues are excluded from large-scale media campaigns and instead are
more specifically targeted to blacks. Yet substantive action on the
major concerns of black Americans is only possible if the electorate at
large is convinced of their importance and legitimacy-an improbable
outcome if these issues are shunted to narrow venues in the national
discourse of a presidential campaign. In order for the mobilization
that Issacharoff seeks to protect to have a substantive benefit to
blacks, money must mobilize mass opinion, not just black votes.
239. Telephone Interview with Donna Brazile, Campaign Manager, Al Gore 2000
Presidential Campaign (June 1, 2001).
240. Brazile noted that the mid-term elections of 1998, in which efforts were targeted
at minorities in June of the election year, and the presidential election of 2000, in which
grassroots efforts directed at minorities were fully funded one month before the election,
are exceptions to the general rule. Id. However, even in these instances, funding was not
put in place as early as Brazile had urged, diluting the potential of black voter
participation.
241. Telephone Interview with Andy Hernandez, former Director of Base Vote,




Finally, Professor Issacharoffs analysis is far too reticent in
observing the myriad ways in which the current campaign finance
system disadvantages minorities and in balancing these disadvantages
against his narrow focus on section 214. Donna Brazile observes that
even Congressional Black Caucus members who hail from majority-
black districts, in which the races are less expensive, are underfunded
in the current system 43 Thus, for instance, unlike their white
counterparts, they lack seed money to seek higher office and cannot
fully exercise other prerogatives of incumbency that better-funded
white incumbents are free to exercise.24 Andy Hernandez noted that
in his experience at the Democratic National Committee, race hurt
the funding possibilities for a minority candidate.245 According to
Hernandez, if minority candidates trailed in a race, rather than
attempt to buttress their chances with money, Democrats were more
inclined to write off the candidate than a similarly-situated white
candidate.24 6 In examining "the likely effect of a more regulated
campaign environment on black political participation,"'247 Professor
Issacharoff fails to adequately address travails such as these, instead
offering much caution about reform but too little critical observation
about the pall of the current system.
C. Toward First Principles: Money and Black Ideology
Law professors are in the habit of asking both students (in the
classroom setting) and colleagues (in the scholarly setting) to put
forth a statute that will address the problems that their analyses point
out. I save this exercise for another time and venue, for I believe it is
important to begin with the establishment of first principles, the
effective application of which may well result in a concrete legislative
proposal.
1. The ShawlBuckley Nexus
In the long term, in order to be inclusive of minority interests,
the reform movement must seek (and achieve) the reversal of both
Shaw v. Reno2 and Buckley v. Valeo.24 9 The reversal of Shaw would
acknowledge that race is a valuable and necessary speech resource for
243. Interview with Donna Brazile, supra note 239.
244. Id.
245. Interview with Andy Hernandez, supra note 241.
246. Id.
247. Issacharoff, supra note 233, at 1526.
248. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
249. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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voters of color, even in a political system in which money is more
closely regulated. To return to the Helms-Gantt contest for a
moment, even if Helms and Gantt were evenly matched in their
spending-perhaps through a public financing scheme-this would
not preclude Helms from seizing the racial low ground, priming white
voters' fears and biases. The equalization of dollars in a bi-racial
contest may compel the race-baiter to be more judicious in the
expenditure of his resources, but it will not eliminate race-baiting.
Seeking the reversal of Shaw would be a recognition by reformers
that majority-minority districts enable the voices of minority voters
and candidates to be heard-both at the electoral stage and
ultimately in the legislative process-when those voices might
otherwise be shut out by racial bloc voting.
The overruling of Buckley's prohibition on expenditure caps is
essential not only for greater equality among white voters of different
means and for greater white-black parity in bi-racial contests but for
two arguably larger reasons as well. If we seek a more public-
regarding legislative process-and by this, I mean at a minimum one
that is less corrupted by both money and race-we must make money
less of a tool for division. This begins by limiting its role. Money
buys racial division, and these schisms express themselves in the
legislative process as well as at the polls. If poor and middle class
whites view the "special interests" that siphon their tax dollars as the
black welfare cheats rather than corporate interests and the wealthy,
while blacks continue to suspect that whites as a whole are
unresponsive to their needs, we cannot expect these groups-a
majority of the population-to see their mutual interests. As long as
they do not, someone else's interests will continue to be served.
Overturning Buckley is also an important complement to the
creation of majority-minority districts. We cannot assume that black
candidates are immune to the negative influences of money. 2 0 To
treat expenditures as protected speech in the context of a majority-
minority district is simply to advantage the minority candidate who
has access to greater funds, even if that candidate would not best
represent the interests of the district. Thus, Buckley's operation in
majority-minority districts may well elevate symbolic representation
above substantive representation, an odd throwback to the fallacious
premise of Shaw that blacks elect blacks just to elect blacks.
250. See Jonathan P. Hicks, Expert Fund-Raiser Challenges Congressman, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 1998, at B10 (reporting a challenger's attack on Congressman Adolphus Towns, a




2. Affirmative Action in Campaign Financing
Beyond the conjoining of Shaw and Buckley, inclusionary
campaign finance reform must promote minority candidates and
minority issues. As Part I.B of this Article illustrates, political money
is seldom if ever non-ideological and is often used with racial malice.
Campaign finance reform, then, cannot credibly be presented to
minorities in terms other than the ideological and racialized context
of political money itself.
For the time being, the Democratic Party is the home of the
overwhelming majority of black Americans."' The organizational
politics and policies of the Democrats have permitted blacks to play
significant leadership roles, constituting, for instance, 21.1% of the
Democratic National Committee and 20.1% of the delegates to the
2000 Democratic National Convention. 25 These numbers are a
reward, albeit an inadequate one, for black loyalty to the Democratic
Party. In a political process where money is essential, blacks and
other minorities must also seek a proportionate share of this type of
reward. Minorities must insist on a pact with the Democratic Party in
which the party will set goals for the nomination and election of
minority candidates to high-visibility political offices and will commit
to ensure that these candidates have the resources to compete
effectively for that office. The latter commitment would entail (1) a
hard money affirmative action program, in which donors are actively
encouraged to contribute to minority candidates through the creation
of incentives which parallel traditional incentives for party donors;
and (2) if party soft money survives, either because McCain-Feingold
is defeated or struck down by a court, a soft money affirmative action
program of a similar vein.
The nomination and election of minority candidates is not always
possible or even desirable. This should not mean, however, that
minority issues are neglected in a campaign, as they were during the
2000 presidential contest2 3 Minorities, then, must also insist that
party monies be spent not merely to bring them to the polls, but more
importantly to address issues of unique interest to them so that there
is a greater substantive basis for their support.
251. David A. Bositis, Blacks and the 2000 Democratic National Convention 2,
available at http://www.jointcenter.org/campaign2000/Democratic.htm (2000) (last visited
Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting that 80% of African
Americans have consistently identified themselves as Democratic and an even higher
percentage usually votes Democratic).
252. Id. at 8.
253. See supra note 88.
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3. Economic Inequity and Public Financing or Subsidies
Neither of the foregoing principles addresses the fundamental
economic disparities between black and white Americans, which in
turn translate into disparities in levels of political contributions and
access to the legislative process. 4 There is arguably no short-term
solution to this problem other than a system of public financing or
public subsidies to poorer candidates. 5 Inclusionary reform will
perhaps have to embrace such a scheme, whatever its imperfections.
CONCLUSION
Bulworth may be right: "Rich people have always stayed on top
by dividing white people from colored people. But white people got
more in common with colored people than they do with rich
people." 6 Yet, it is precisely because of judicial ratification of this
process of division, in the form of the Supreme Court's disparate
application of the Equal Protection Clause to people of color, that
blacks and whites need campaign finance reform for different reasons
and in different ways. Until reformers recognize how race changes
the dynamics of reform-indeed, how it threatens the goals of
reform-reform will not only be ironically exclusionary, but its goals,
such as a more public-regarding legislative process, may remain
elusive.
254. See generally Model NAACP Resolution on Campaign Finance Reform, at
http://www.flhp.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (detailing the economic disparities between blacks and whites and their
consequences with respect to political donations and access to power).
255. See id. (calling for the enactment of voluntary public financing of elections).
256. BULWORTH, supra note 1.
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